C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

247The role of the Netherlands: no to the suitcase operationThe Netherlands MIS hardly played a role in this Sigint war between 1992 and 1995. The service, andthus also the Ministry of Defence, were completely dependent on the intelligence that allies wereprepared to exchange. Since the MIS had almost nothing to offer, however, this exchange remainedvery limited. The MIS could have played an important role if the secret American proposal forDutchbat to take Comint suitcases into the enclave had been accepted. If true that the CIA made thisoffer five or six times, then it can be concluded that the US services themselves clearly were notachieving good results. Following each refusal the Americans came back to ask again; this is anindication that they were apparently not able to intercept the short-range communications traffic fromsatellites, U-2R aircraft or other aircraft. This was confirmed by British and Canadian intelligenceofficials. Flights by the U-2R did not provide much useful intelligence either. The main reason forsetting up one intelligence cell, the Deployed Shed Facility in Naples, was therefore because the NSAhad major gaps in its Comint in Bosnia. 1304The US services were obviously desperate to change the situation; this meant that if the Dutchhad agreed to the suitcases operation, the Americans would presumably have done everything theycould to maintain friendship with the MIS. Agreeing to the operation would probably also haveresulted in the MIS being able to give Dutchbat ‘ears’ and perhaps also ‘eyes’ in Srebrenica. The ‘ears’would have been the capability to monitor VRS and ABiH radio traffic in and around the enclave, and‘eyes’ would have been provided because the CIA, as part of the exchange of intelligence, wouldprobably have also been able to share aerial photographs – which the Canadians had also been able toaccess. This would have given the MIS a strong position of power; if the Americans had not kept totheir promises, then turning off the switch would have been an effective threat.Turning to the opinion of the former head of the MIS that the Bosnian Serbs would not havelet this monitoring equipment through, one can note that it is unlikely that the VRS soldiers whomanned the checkpoints would really have been capable to judge whether the suitcases were intendedfor communications or for monitoring equipment. The entire interception capability was contained inthe software supplied with the package: the equipment itself looked like a normal transmitter andreceiver. It would have been easy to ship in a few suitcases with the arrival of Dutchbat I, becauseDutchbat I was allowed to take its own communications equipment in the normal manner.For national use the Royal Netherlands Army had already provided a coded telephone and faxfor the commander of Dutchbat, for the Defence Crisis Management Centre and the Army Crisis Staffin The Hague, for the Dutch Deputy Commander of Sector North East in Tuzla, Colonel C. Brantz,and for General Nicolai of Bosnia Hercegovina Command. 1305 During the fall of the town this satellitetelephone worked well. This sophisticated technology was packed in six suitcases; 1306 and if these couldbe taken into the enclave, then why not the American suitcases? The only answer to the question whythe suitcases were not permitted to be taken in was because the ‘top brass’ of the Netherlands Armydid not wish to allow this type of operation. Refusing the deployment of their own national Sigintassets in Bosnia meant that DutchBat was cut off from an important flow of intelligence. Would theNetherlands have been unique as a smaller member of NATO by deploying their own assets? Not at allbecause other smaller members of NATO like Denmark had already deployed their own national assetswith respect to Sigint in Bosnia. Refusing the American offer was not wise and shortsighted. 1307Therefore it is very difficult to understand why general Couzy until this day is defending thisdecision. 13081304 Confidential interview (22).1305 MoD, CRST. G-6 RNLA Crisis Staff to CS Netherlands Army Crisis Staff, 09/05/95.1306 ‘Binnen halve minuut is Dutchbat thuis’ (Dutchbat home in half a minute), Haagsche Courant, 13/07/95.1307 Interview with General T. Lyng, 29/10/99.1308 Testimony of General H. Couzy before the Netherlands Parliamentary Inquiry into Srebrenica, 21/11/02.