C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

153starting to have concerns about the Iran connection, and Woolsey wanted to prevent his servicebecoming the object of this concern. 745Some sections of the Clinton administration resented this move, because it ultimately led to anextremely thorough internal investigation by the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) that lasted sixmonths, and that concentrated on three questions: whether Galbraith and Redman had offeredassistance to Tudjman; whether either one of the ambassadors had actively intervened with Croatianofficials for the transit of arms; and whether Galbraith or Holbrooke had offered arms and funds toBosnia or Croatia. At the same time, the Intelligence Oversight Board examined whether Frenchaccusations from March 1994, that the Americans had executed airdrops over Bosnia, were correct.And the IOB also scrutinized the deployment of US Special Forces, who originally went toBosnia to assist in humanitarian relief. However, some Canadian and Swedish UNMOs had seen theseunits unloading and handling cargo. The Canadian report came from Visoko; the Swedish report camefrom Tuzla, where a Civil Affairs official of Sector North East made no secret of his Special Forcesbackground. 746 Otherwise, American Special Forces were present throughout Bosnia: a British officerhad personally witnessed an US Special Forces colonel scouting out the territory during a visit to theBritish headquarters in Gornji Vakuf in 1993. When asked what he was doing there, the Americananswered that he was looking for suitable helicopter landing places. In a night-time operation one daylater, American C-130s dropped equipment, ammunition and arms, which were apparently transportedin helicopters for the ABiH, and a few days later ABiH soldiers were walking around in brand newAmerican uniforms carrying M-16 rifles. This was remarkable, because those were nowhere to be foundin the Balkans. 747In May 1995, the IOB arrived at a better than expected conclusion for the supporters of thearms supplies resumption via the Croatian pipeline, namely that no definitive conclusions could bedrawn on what had happened, but that no ‘covert action was conducted in arms shipments and no U.S.laws were broken’; there had been no ‘improper encouragement to President Tudjman’, and theactivities of Redman and Galbraith fell under ‘traditional diplomatic activity’, which required nopermission from Congress. According to Redman, the Bosnian Muslims actually never discussed armssupplies with the Americans, because it was known in Sarajevo how legalistic American governmentthinking was. 748 A subsequent conclusion of the IOB was that Holbrooke had made no offer. ThePentagon and the CIA had already investigated these French accusations and arrived at the conclusionthat no such activities took place, and that furthermore no US Special Forces had been involved. 749The further American policy on the Croatian pipelineIn early 1995 James Woolsey resigned as Director Central Intelligence. A senior White House adviserstated that Woolsey’s relationship with the White House and Congress was poor, and that this causedhis departure. He described him as someone with ‘an inherent tendency of always swimming against thestream’. 750 Woolsey agreed with this observation but for other reasons. ‘If you are a Director of CentralIntelligence and you let the politicians tell you what intelligence should say, then you are a menace tothe country’s security’. 751 Woolsey’s successor was John Deutch, and in 1997 Clinton appointed Lake as745 Interview with R.J. Woolsey, 08/06/00.746 O’shea, Crisis at Bihac, p. 159.747 Confidential interview (80).748 Interview with Charles Redman, 27/06/01.749 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence US Senate, U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers to theBosnian Army, 1994-1995, Washington DC, 1996, p. 4.750 Confidential interview (14).751 Interview with James R. Woolsey, 01/10/02.