C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

56Sources in SIS nonetheless asserted that, after the US services, the largest volume of British intelligencesharing takes place with the German services but also the Scandinavian services. The prevailing politicalclimate in Europe also plays an important role. If the German-French political axis is functioning well,the collaboration in the area of intelligence is usually excellent, and joint operations are sometimesexecuted. If a change takes place in the political climate, this immediately influences the intelligenceliaison. 233 Within NATO, the entire subject of intelligence liaison is much more sensitive than is usuallymade known to the outside world. It seems in general that member states are prepared to share onlythe intelligence that they wish to share, and which does not endanger national security in the widestsense. Furthermore, certain member states have already been on a ‘war footing’ with each other for aconsiderable time, such as Greece and Turkey. This plays a role not only in the conflict in Cyprus andin certain territorial disputes, but also in the conflict in the Balkans: Athens took the side of Serbia andSrpska, and Turkey the side of Bosnia. This strongly reduced the willingness of other NATO memberstates to share intelligence on Yugoslavia within the alliance, because Greece and Turkey could ‘misuse’it in some way.There was also a great fear of leaks within NATO. While the war surrounding Kosovo was stillin progress, for example, more than six hundred officials at NATO headquarters knew the next NATObombing targets approximately 24 hours in advance. It was no surprise that the Serbian intelligenceservices were able to gather intelligence in Brussels and Bergen/Mons. The long-term absence ofFrance in the NATO military committee also did nothing to improve intelligence liaison. In addition,member states will have been more careful with their intelligence because of the Partners for Peaceprogramme (the collaboration between NATO and Russia) and a fear that information would be leakedto some former Warsaw pact countries. The sharing of intelligence in peacekeeping operations isfurther impeded because permission is always necessary from national headquarters. The bureaucracymeans that this can take some considerable time, as a result of which the intelligence to be shared mayalready be out of date. 234 An US intelligence official who worked in Bosnia dismissed thisrepresentation. According to him, US policies were well-defined, and release authority was delegatedappropriately to the lowest possible level, to ensure fluid sharing of defined products within acceptableguidelines. 235Apart from NATO, European organizations played no role whatsoever in the field ofintelligence. Although the WEU took part in the sea blockade within the framework of the sanctions,this treaty organization had no intelligence capacity of its own. Neither did the EU. Originally, theconflict was not immediately a NATO problem. A factor for the UN (like the WEU and EU) was thatit did not undertake its own intelligence gathering, in the sense that the headquarters in New York andthe commanders in the region formulated their own objectives, and were themselves able to deploy thenecessary resources.A well-structured exchange of intelligence within NATO would, in spite of all these problems,nevertheless have been desirable, because a large number of NATO member states also took part inUNPROFOR. In addition, the nature of the crisis in Yugoslavia was of a completely different orderfrom that which NATO was accustomed to. The intelligence liaison regarding Bosnia stands or falls,however, on two things. On the policy decision to share at all. Once that decision is made, the scope ofthe obligations under the agreement defines the technical, political, financial and intelligence geographyof the exchange. Secondly, whether the Western intelligence services were sufficiently prepared for thecrisis in Bosnia, and whether there was sufficient intelligence to share.233 Grant, Intimate Relations, pp. 4-5.234 Hugh Smith, ‘Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, Vol. 36 (1994) 3, p. 177.235 Confidential information (80).