380Another twelve private collections were consulted which it was agreed would rema<strong>in</strong> confid<strong>en</strong>tial.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (1): docum<strong>en</strong>ts orig<strong>in</strong>ally from the American State <strong>De</strong>partm<strong>en</strong>t.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (2): a large number of docum<strong>en</strong>ts dat<strong>in</strong>g from 1994-1995 which were orig<strong>in</strong>allyfrom G-2 UNPF Zagreb, and 11.000 military diary notes on CD-ROM.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (3): report on Unprofor <strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce acquisition.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (4): several Interoffice Memoranda from the Military Information OfficeUNPF-HQ.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (5): UNMO docum<strong>en</strong>ts from the UN headquarters <strong>in</strong> Zagreb.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (6): diplomatic correspond<strong>en</strong>ce of foreign orig<strong>in</strong>.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (7): military docum<strong>en</strong>ts of Canadian orig<strong>in</strong>.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (8): military docum<strong>en</strong>ts of foreign orig<strong>in</strong>.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (9): notes and policy docum<strong>en</strong>ts.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (10): notes and policy docum<strong>en</strong>ts.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (11): notes and reports of Bosnian orig<strong>in</strong>.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (12): docum<strong>en</strong>ts about secret arms supplies to Tuzla.Confid<strong>en</strong>tial Collection (13): docum<strong>en</strong>ts related to the trial of G<strong>en</strong>eral Krstic before the YugoslaviaTribunal, which were not <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the trial docum<strong>en</strong>ts.BooksA.Aart, Dick <strong>van</strong> <strong>de</strong>r Spionage <strong>van</strong>uit <strong>de</strong> lucht, Weesp, 1990.Aid, Matthew and <strong>Wiebes</strong>, Cees (ed.), Secrets of Signals <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cold War and Beyond,London, 2001.Aldrich, Richard, The Hidd<strong>en</strong> Hand. Brita<strong>in</strong>, America and Cold War Secret <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>, London, 2001.Andreatta, Filippo, The Bosnian War and the New World Or<strong>de</strong>r, WEU Occasional Paper No. 1, October1996.Andrew, Christopher, For the Presid<strong>en</strong>t’s Eyes Only. Secret <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and the American Presid<strong>en</strong>cyfrom Wash<strong>in</strong>gton to Bush, London, <strong>1995.</strong>Assemblee Nationale, Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica: rapport sur un massacre, Assemblee Nationale, No 3412, 2 volumes, Paris2001.B.Baer, Robert, See No Evil. The True Story of a Ground Soldier <strong>in</strong> the CIA’s War on Terrorism, NewYork, 2002.Bais, Ka<strong>rol</strong>i<strong>en</strong>, Het mijn<strong>en</strong>veld <strong>van</strong> e<strong>en</strong> vre<strong>de</strong>smacht. Ne<strong>de</strong>rlandse blauwhelm<strong>en</strong> <strong>in</strong> Cambodja, D<strong>en</strong>Haag 1994.Bamford, James, Body of Secrets. Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Ag<strong>en</strong>cy from the ColdWar through the Dawn of a New C<strong>en</strong>tury, New York, 2001.Beale, M.O., Bombs over Bosnia: the Role of Airpower <strong>in</strong> Bosnia: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,1997.Becker, David W.,Com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> from the cold war: <strong>de</strong>f<strong>en</strong>se hum<strong>in</strong>t servces support to military operationsother than war, Fort Leav<strong>en</strong>worth, Kansas, 2000.Beek, R. ter, Manoeuvrer<strong>en</strong>: her<strong>in</strong>ner<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong> aan Ple<strong>in</strong> 4, Amsterdam, 1996.Bell, Mart<strong>in</strong>, In Harm’s Way, London, 1996.Berdal, Mats R., The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 1954-60, London, 1997.Berdal, Mats R., Whither UN Peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g?, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1993.Bert, W., The Reluctant Superpower: United States’ Policy <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, 1991-95, New York, 1997.Bildt, Carl, Peace Journey. The Struggle for Peace <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, London, 1998.Blank, Steph<strong>en</strong>, Yugoslavia’s Wars: The Problem from Hell, New York, 1995Blood, Th., Madam Secretary: a Biography of Ma<strong>de</strong>la<strong>in</strong>e Albright, New York, 1999.
Bodansky, Y., Off<strong>en</strong>sive <strong>in</strong> the Balkans: the Pot<strong>en</strong>tial for a Wi<strong>de</strong>r War as a Result of ForeignInterv<strong>en</strong>tion <strong>in</strong> Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, Alexandria, Virg<strong>in</strong>ia, <strong>1995.</strong>Both, N., From Indiffer<strong>en</strong>ce to Entrapm<strong>en</strong>t: The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands with regard to theYugoslav Crisis betwe<strong>en</strong> 1990 and 1995, Amsterdam, 2000.Boutros-Ghali, B., Un<strong>van</strong>quished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga, New York, 1999.Briquemont, F., Do Someth<strong>in</strong>g, G<strong>en</strong>eral: Kroniek <strong>van</strong> <strong>Bosnië</strong>-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, Antwerp<strong>en</strong>, 1998.Buha, A., Argum<strong>en</strong>ts <strong>en</strong> Faveur <strong>de</strong> la République Serbe, Lausanne: 1999.Bulatovic, Ljijlana, G<strong>en</strong>eral Mladic, Beograd, 1996.Bülow, Andreas von, Im Names <strong>de</strong>s Staates. CIA, BND und die krim<strong>in</strong>ell<strong>en</strong> Mach<strong>en</strong>schaft<strong>en</strong> <strong>de</strong>rGeheimdi<strong>en</strong>ste, Münch<strong>en</strong>, 1998.Burg, S.L. <strong>en</strong> P.S. Shoup, The War <strong>in</strong> Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a: Ethnic Conflict and InternationalInterv<strong>en</strong>tion, Armonk, N.Y./London, 2000.Burrows, William E., <strong>De</strong>ep Black. Space Espionage and National Security, New York, 1986.Butler, Richard, The Greatest Threat, New York, 2001.C.Carmel, Hesi (editor), <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> for Peace. The Role of <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> <strong>in</strong> Times of Peace, London, 1999.Cekic, S., Uzroci, ciljevi i razmere agresije na Bosnu I Hercegov<strong>in</strong>u 1991-1995: Causes, Objectives andExt<strong>en</strong>t of the Aggression aga<strong>in</strong>st Bosnia and Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a 1991-<strong>1995.</strong> -- Sarajevo, <strong>1995.</strong>Christopher, W., Chances of a Lifetime, New York, 2001.Christopher, W., In the Stream of History: Shap<strong>in</strong>g Foreign Policy for a New Era, Stanford, Cal., 1998.CIA, The Acme of Skill, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, n.d.CIA, Factbook on <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton D.C., 1990CIA, CIA Docum<strong>en</strong>ts on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton D.C., <strong>1992</strong>CIA, A Consumer’s Gui<strong>de</strong> to <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton D.C., 1993CIA History Staff, Directors and <strong>De</strong>puty Directors of C<strong>en</strong>tral <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton D.C., 1994.Cigar, N., G<strong>en</strong>oci<strong>de</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bosnia: the Policy of ‘Ethnic Cleans<strong>in</strong>g’, College Station, <strong>1995.</strong>Clark, W.K., Wag<strong>in</strong>g Mo<strong>de</strong>rn War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, New York, 2001.CM 4897, <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and Security Committee, Annual Report 1999-2000, 02/11/00.Co<strong>de</strong>villa, A., Inform<strong>in</strong>g Statecraft: <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> for a New C<strong>en</strong>tury, New York, <strong>1992</strong>.Coh<strong>en</strong>, B. and G. Stamkoski, With no Peace to Keep: United Nations Peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g and the war <strong>in</strong> theformer Yuogoslavia, London, <strong>1995.</strong>Coh<strong>en</strong>, Ph.J., Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the <strong>De</strong>ceit of History, College Station, 1996.Coh<strong>en</strong>, R., Hearts grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo, New York, 1998.Committee on International Relations, House of Repres<strong>en</strong>tatives, Hear<strong>in</strong>g before the Subcommittee onInternational Operations and Human Rights, The Betrayal of Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica: Why Did the Massacre Happ<strong>en</strong>? WillIt Happ<strong>en</strong> Aga<strong>in</strong>?, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, March 31, 1998.Connaughton, Richard, Military Interv<strong>en</strong>tion and Peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g: The Reality, Lancaster, 2002Cornish, Paul, Partnership <strong>in</strong> Crisis. The U.S., Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO, London, 1997.Corw<strong>in</strong>, Philip, Dubious Mandate. A Memoir of the UN <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, Summer 1995, Durham andLondon, 1999Cot, J. (ed.), <strong>De</strong>rnière guerre Balkanique?: ex-Yougoslavie: témoignages, analyses, perspectives, Paris,1996.Coulon, J., Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g, and the New World Or<strong>de</strong>r,Toronto, 1998.Couzy, H.A., Mijn Jar<strong>en</strong> als Bevelhebber, Amsterdam, 1996.Craddock, Percy, Know Your Enemy. How the Jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Committee Saw the World,tvLondon, 2002.Curtis, Mark, The Great <strong>De</strong>ception, Anglo-American Power and World Or<strong>de</strong>r, London, 1998 D.Daal<strong>de</strong>r, Ivo, Gett<strong>in</strong>g to Dayton: the Mak<strong>in</strong>g of America’s Bosnia Policy, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton D.C., 2000.<strong>De</strong>partm<strong>en</strong>t of <strong>De</strong>f<strong>en</strong>se, Directive S-5100-20, The National Security Ag<strong>en</strong>cy and the C<strong>en</strong>tral SecurityService, 23/12/71381
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Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ areaAppend
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23undermined the idea that the inte
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25that the safety of their personne
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27to generate an all-source perspec
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29in all, Van Kappen found it a ‘
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31The first step taken by the Bush
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33Virginia, where it was decided wh
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35a dual responsibility to support
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37had indications that this attack
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39example, the following is contain
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41played an important role. For thi
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43any indication of action taken. T
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45verification flights by unmanned
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47NATO’s most important troop-con
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49strategic systems were revamped t
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51Another problem was that good (no
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53American National Reconnaissance
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55Soviet Union’s intercontinental
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62intelligence officers even told t
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67atrocities but the Bosnian Serbs
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70Republika Srpska. The work was no
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74involved in intelligence activiti
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76Forces were said to have received
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78exchange, then generally speaking
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80Chapter 3Dutch intelligence and s
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82reorganization of the MIS. In 199
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84commotion flaring up within the s
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86intelligence. 394 Until that time
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88their relief goods for Bosnia tha
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90The BVD collaborated closely on Y
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94cutbacks recommended by the Van I
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97information without compromising
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99Yugoslavia did not prove to be a
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101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing wit
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103German, Italian and Danish intel
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105Originally, the European Bureau
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107that an insight was obtained usi
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109They made civil and military ris
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111In other words, the flow of info
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113three tasks: looking for indicat
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115In reality the MIS/Army function
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117his benefit, and many others. It
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119too. This had already been estab
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121negative assessment: not to go t
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123capacity of the UN, but as descr
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125organizations that could possibl
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127Department, the Counterintellige
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129MIS/Air Force officer went to Tu
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131entering into close relationship
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133One envelope contained several f
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135any indications of continuous gu
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137more and more clear, turned a de
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139intended to monitor the border c
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141opinion. 665 After Croatia had n
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143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Can
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145engage these countries, but each
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147Later that day, Galbraith report
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149form of photos taken by spy sate
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151In the summer and autumn of 1994
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153starting to have concerns about
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155preferred provider of weapons to
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157Because of the logistical useful
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159An Islamic humanitarian organiza
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161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8
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163the convoys from Croatia with ar
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165The attempt at a cover-upAs ment
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167Force Commander and with General
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169urging it, because they suspecte
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171General and researcher, Brendan
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173mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 h
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175divergent opinions on the Serbia
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177had total freedom of movement al
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179violations were observed. These
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181and Jugoslavija Publik. Accordin
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183command and the rival Iranian, S
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185much contact with the population
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187from the enclave a total of 140
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189The third party country strategy
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191the warring factions, namely tha
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193Chapter 5The Signals Intelligenc
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195In addition Comint can be import
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197policymakers, however. As a resu
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199A second disadvantage of Sigint,
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201All efforts can of course also b
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203125 linguists to provide transla
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205time intercepts involved here we
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207conclusion that the contribution
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209happened during the Gulf War, wh
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211The Gulf War showed that there w
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213Despite this reservation there i
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215The NSA and CIA, as well as GCHQ
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217million messages, sent via Intel
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219Zagreb, Morgan, - Svensson was o
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221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOffi
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223jar’, said an US intelligence
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225Naturally the Serbs had taken pr
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227confirmed that monitoring walkie
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229The same month new articles appe
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231‘They more or less admitted th
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233have been part of a Bosnian gove
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235get O’Grady out of Bosnian Ser
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237as the Balkans. Two to three yea
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239Comint archive and other archive
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241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in
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243communications traffic of UNPROF
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245Moreover, the NSA is reported to
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247The role of the Netherlands: no
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249made by Krstic and other Bosnian
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251messages, which were intercepted
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253later treetops were used. Throug
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255Conclusions on the interception
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257equipment, planned operations, t
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259made it impossible to follow the
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261community that the situation was
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263commander of the Bosnian-Serb Dr
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265to headquarters. The Comint oper
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267Intelligence Community had no ac
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269aid being sent to Sarajevo. Both
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271established in 1991, also receiv
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273crypto telephone and fax with th
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275to Baxter, the Military Assistan
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277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in
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2792. What instruments were availab
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281would leave around 18 hours out
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283and has provided policy-makers w
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285operational in Bosnia, like the
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287lines and troop movements. After
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289around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Thi
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291that especially American, French
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293So, it would have been impossibl
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2953. With whom was imagery intelli
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297available. 1606 The head of the
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299war crimes had probably been per
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301a US national asset (unknow is w
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303Mostar and loitered in Zepa area
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305Albright shows the photosOn 10 A
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307was taken some time in 1999, eve
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309tracking the civilian toll had v
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311solution to such problems in ad
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313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an
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315gathered intelligence, then it m
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317the VRS attack should aim to tak
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319In January 1995 a European intel
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321stated that the deployment of th
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323The Military Intelligence Servic
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325by the Norwegian Brigadier Gener
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327Bosnian Serbs decided that they
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