C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

81service was actually disbanded in January 1994. Section 2 discusses how the IDB was occupied with theBalkans nonetheless.Section 3 covers the role and information position of the BVD, which was involved in theconflict because the stationing of soldiers in Bosnia could have consequences for the Netherlandsnational security and the democratic rule of law. From the Netherlands, the secret services of thewarring factions might carry out operations, attempt to raise funds, or send weapons and ammunitionto the region. Section 4 comprehensively considers the MIS, whose most important task was indistributing intelligence to the army leaders and the most senior politicians and officials of the Ministryof Defence on the dispatch and deployment of Dutchbat in Bosnia. The question arises as to what theMIS did in the way of Force Protection and whether any intelligence was supplied that was of benefitto Dutchbat.A comment that immediately can be made on the role of the MIS is that small and mediumsizedstates that participated in peacekeeping operations, such as the Netherlands, often do not havethe capacity to gather accurate and timely intelligence on each part of the world where troops are sentin a UN context. These countries are therefore completely dependent on what other intelligenceservices are prepared to exchange with them via liaison. But it should be said that this is not a naturalfact, but often, as will be shown, the result of policy decisions hinged on funding, capability andpolitical will.Section 5 discusses the intelligence gathering in the enclave under Dutchbats I, II and III.Section 6 considers the collaboration between the MIS of the Central Organization (MIS/CO) and theArmy’s MIS (hereafter MIS/Army), which did not always appear to be particularly good in practice.Another MIS department that was responsible for gathering intelligence on Bosnia was the RoyalNetherlands Air Force. Section 7 pays attention to the production of the Air Force section of the MIS(hereafter MIS/Air Force). Section 8 then considers the support the MIS received from UNPROFOR.The question remains as to what the MIS supplied in the way of intelligence to senior Ministry ofDefence officials. This will be discussed in Section 9. Section 10 considers the role of the MIS inrelationship to military security. Finally, Section 11 presents the conclusions.The Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security ServicesWhen the war in the Balkans broke out, the Netherlands had a clear intelligence structure, with thethree services mentioned above. All three were engaged in following the war in Bosnia. The threeservices were controlled by the Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services(MICIV), which was formally responsible for the general policy on intelligence and security and thecoordination of these services. This Ministerial Committee consisted of the Ministers of ForeignAffairs, Justice, the Interior, Defence, Finance, and Economic Affairs, as well as the chairman of theCommittee on the United Intelligence Services in the Netherlands (CVIN), the heads of the threeintelligence and security services and a senior official from each of the ministries mentioned. TheMinisterial Committee is chaired by the prime minister and is convened when ministerial level decisionmakingis desirable on intelligence and security issues. The decisions of the Ministerial Committee aresubsequently always discussed in the next session of the Ministerial Council. 380The Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (MICIV) met five timesbetween 1991 and 1995. The meetings in 1992-1995 were concerned mainly with winding up the IDB.It was decided in 1991 to slim down the IDB, and the consequences of the developments in Centraland Eastern Europe for the work of the services were discussed.In 1992, the agenda included updating the BVD’s tasks in Central and Western Europe. Thetake-over of the activities of the IDB by the BVD and MIS received particular attention, as did the380 W.J. Kuijken, ‘De coördinatie van de Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten in verleden, heden en toekomst’ (‘The coordination of the Dutch intelligence and security services inthe past, present and future’), in: Militaire Spectator,Vol. 170 (2001) 11, pp. 562-563.