C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

89started early in 1993 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time a start had yet to be made in theNetherlands on gathering information from ex-Yugoslav Displaced Persons, which could be used asevidence for a Tribunal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the initiative of setting up a task force. 407The BVD collaborated closely with the Yugoslav war criminals investigation team of the NationalCriminal Intelligence Agency (CRI) and with the Public Prosecutor (OM) in Arnhem, who wasresponsible for investigating whether these alleged war criminals could be prosecuted. The Chief PublicProsecutor, A.P. Besier, constantly hesitated about resorting to prosecution, however. ‘The PublicProsecutor saw little reason to do so, and that is putting it mildly’, according to a BVD official. Theperformance of the war criminals investigation team was consequently limited. 408Secret services of the various Yugoslav republics were meanwhile becoming increasingly activeon Dutch territory. The BVD had serious indications that a network of Serbian criminals had branchesin Holland and it had connections with the Serbian secret service and Serbian government. There was afear of violent actions on the part of these criminals. The BVD also observed that the Bosniangovernment obliged Bosnian refugees in other countries by law to pay income tax to finance theconflict. Refusal could have serious consequences for family members remaining in Bosnia. The servicehad not yet found any firm evidence of this, however. 409In 1995, the BVD had to admit that the developments in the former Yugoslavia had onlylimited consequences for the national security. The changed situation in the Balkans prompted only amuted response among ex-Yugoslavs in the Netherlands. It had not led to any form of organizedpolitical activity in the Netherlands. With respect to the horizontal threat (within the Yugoslavcommunity) and the vertical threat (oriented against Dutch subjects and institutions) the fear hadreceded significantly in 1995, and with it the attention of the BVD. 410 The BVD continued to keep awatchful eye on monitoring and influencing activities by the Yugoslav embassy. The remarks made in1994 regarding the criminal network with political connections were more or less retracted. Whileorganized crime was indeed a phenomenon to be taken seriously, there were hardly any indications ofcontinuous control from political power centres in the former Yugoslavia. The BVD was therefore notprepared to start investigations of its own into this area.A remarkable affair that the BVD (and later also the MIS) was involved with, was that of theSerb defector Cedomir Mihailovic, who was said to have fled Serbia in October 1994 with the help ofthe Dutch embassy, which had given him a temporary passport on 6 October. Mihailovic hadimportant documents on Milosevic’s involvement in war crimes in Bosnia. Furthermore, he put himselfforward as an intermediary for Karadzic, who - he claimed - was prepared to exchange the three easternenclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde for other Bosnian-Serb areas in Bosnia. The BVD suspectedthat Mihailovic was working for the Serbian secret service, SDB, and was attempting in this way to mapout how the Western intelligence and security services operated, and who the discussion partners were.The Mihailovic case gave rise to friction between the BVD and the MIS, because the MIS wasnot immediately given access to him when he had arrived in the Netherlands. Both services arrived atthe conclusion, however, that he was probably not to be trusted. The Tribunal judge, RichardGoldstone, would later also arrive at the conclusion that the documents he had handed over werefalsifications. After that, Mihailovic was said to have left the Netherlands; 411 he sought publicity fromabroad 412 and ultimately received a United States visa. How reliable he was remained unclear. 413407 NMFA, DDI DIO, Memorandum: War crimes in former Yugoslavia, 06/01/93 and Coordination meeting on the former Yugoslavia, 10/02/93.408 Confidential interview (15).409 Minister of the Interior, BVD annual report 1994, pp. 32 - 35.410 Confidential interview (15).411 Roger Cohen, ‘serb Says Files Link Milosevic To War Crimes’, in: The New York Times, 13/04/95; Roger Cohen, ‘serbian documents prove Milosevic is a War Criminal’, in: The New YorkTimes, 14/04/95 and Roger Cohen, ‘Dutch Hold Serb War Crime Documents’, in: The New York Times, 04/05/01.412 Minister of the Interior, BVD annual report 1995, pp. 33 - 34.413 Cohen, Hearts grown brutal, p. 410.