Hayd<strong>en</strong>, Michael V., ‘Warfighters and <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>: one team - one fight’, <strong>in</strong>: <strong>De</strong>f<strong>en</strong>se <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Journal;Vol. 4, No. 2 (1995).Hayd<strong>en</strong>, Robert M., ‘Reply’, <strong>in</strong>: Slavic Review, Vol. 55 (W<strong>in</strong>ter 1996) 4.H<strong>en</strong>riks<strong>en</strong>, Thomas H., ‘Covert Operations, Now More Than Ever’, <strong>in</strong>: Orbis, Vol. 44 (W<strong>in</strong>ter 2000) 1.Herman, Michael, <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> after the Cold War: contributions to <strong>in</strong>ternational security?, unpublishedpaper.Herman, Michael,Diplomacy and <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>, Diplomatic Studies Programme Discussion Paper No. 39,1998.Hersh, Seymour M., "The <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Gap: How the Digital Age Left Our Spies Out <strong>in</strong> the Cold", <strong>in</strong>:The New Yorker, 06/12/99.Hitz, F.P., ‘Unleash<strong>in</strong>g the Rogue Elephant: September 11 and Lett<strong>in</strong>g the CIA be the CIA’, HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 25 (Spr<strong>in</strong>g 2002) 2.I.‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and policy: What is constant? What is chang<strong>in</strong>g?’, <strong>in</strong>: Comm<strong>en</strong>tary, No. 45 (June 1994).J‘The Army of Bosnia and Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a’, <strong>in</strong>: Janes’s <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Review, February 1993.Jel<strong>in</strong>ic, Berislav, ‘Croatian citiz<strong>en</strong> is the primary f<strong>in</strong>ancier of both Rado<strong>van</strong> Karadzic and Ratko Mladic’,<strong>in</strong>: Nacional, Issue 294, 05/07/01.Jonge, W. <strong>de</strong>, ‘Tra<strong>in</strong> and Equip’, <strong>in</strong>: Militaire Spectator, Vol. 169 (September 2000) 9.Johnson. Loch K., ‘Mak<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> ‘Cycle’ work’, <strong>in</strong>: The International Journal of <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> andCounter<strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce, Vol. 1 (1986) 1.Johnson, Loch K., ‘spies’, <strong>in</strong>: Foreign Policy, (September 2000).Johnston, Paul, ‘No Cloak and Dagger Required: <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Support to UN Peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g’, <strong>in</strong>:<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and National Security, Vol. 12 (1997) 4.Jones, G., ‘Work<strong>in</strong>g with the CIA’, <strong>in</strong>: Parameters, W<strong>in</strong>ter 2001, Volume 2.K.Kahn, David, ‘Cryptology’, <strong>in</strong>: The Encyclopedia Americana, 1987, Vol. 8, p. 276.Kapp<strong>en</strong>, F.E. <strong>van</strong>, ‘strategische <strong>in</strong>licht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong> <strong>en</strong> <strong>de</strong> Ver<strong>en</strong>ig<strong>de</strong> Naties’, <strong>in</strong>: Militaire Spectator, Vol. 170(2001) 11.Kass<strong>in</strong>g, J.R., ‘<strong>De</strong> NAVO <strong>en</strong> <strong>in</strong>licht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong>’, <strong>in</strong>: Militaire Spectator, Vol. 170 (2001), 11.Katz, Ytzhak & Vardi, Ygal, ‘strategies for Data Gather<strong>in</strong>g and Evaluation <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>Community’, <strong>in</strong>: The International Journal of <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and Counter<strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce, Vol. 5 (1991) 3.Kolb, Richard, ‘Into the Heart of Darkness. 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Onafhankelijk <strong>De</strong>f<strong>en</strong>siemagaz<strong>in</strong>e, Maart1997.Kromhout, Gert, ‘Op <strong>de</strong> gr<strong>en</strong>s <strong>van</strong> lucht <strong>en</strong> ruimte’, <strong>in</strong>: <strong>De</strong> Vlieg<strong>en</strong><strong>de</strong> Hollan<strong>de</strong>r, No. 3/97.Kuijk<strong>en</strong>, W.J., ‘<strong>De</strong> coörd<strong>in</strong>atie <strong>van</strong> <strong>de</strong> Ne<strong>de</strong>rlandse <strong>in</strong>licht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong>- <strong>en</strong> veiligheidsdi<strong>en</strong>st<strong>en</strong> <strong>in</strong> verled<strong>en</strong>,hed<strong>en</strong> <strong>en</strong> toekomst’, <strong>in</strong>: Militaire Spectator, Vol. 170 (2001) 11.L.Lake, A., ‘Bosnia: America’s Interest and America’s Role’, <strong>in</strong>: Insi<strong>de</strong> The Army, 11/04/94.Lane, C. and Shanker, T., ‘Bosnia: What the CIA Didn’t Tell Us’, <strong>in</strong> The New York Review of Books,09/05/96.Last, David M., ‘Peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g Doctr<strong>in</strong>e and Conflict Resolution Techniques’, <strong>in</strong>: Armed Forces & Society,Vol. 22 (1995) 2.Loo, P.E. <strong>van</strong>, ‘E<strong>en</strong> op<strong>en</strong> oog voor <strong>de</strong> Balkan’, <strong>in</strong>: Militaire Spectator, Vol.. 170 (2001) 12.Lum, Z., ‘Balkan Eyes: Airborne Recon over Bosnia, <strong>in</strong>: IED On-L<strong>in</strong>e, November <strong>1995.</strong>M.Macartney, J., ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>: A Consumer’s Gui<strong>de</strong>’, <strong>in</strong>: The International Journal of <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> andCounter<strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce, Vol. 2 (1988) 4.390
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82reorganization of the MIS. In 199
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99Yugoslavia did not prove to be a
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101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing wit
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117his benefit, and many others. It
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121negative assessment: not to go t
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123capacity of the UN, but as descr
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127Department, the Counterintellige
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129MIS/Air Force officer went to Tu
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137more and more clear, turned a de
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139intended to monitor the border c
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141opinion. 665 After Croatia had n
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143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Can
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145engage these countries, but each
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147Later that day, Galbraith report
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149form of photos taken by spy sate
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151In the summer and autumn of 1994
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161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8
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163the convoys from Croatia with ar
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167Force Commander and with General
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169urging it, because they suspecte
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171General and researcher, Brendan
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173mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 h
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175divergent opinions on the Serbia
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181and Jugoslavija Publik. Accordin
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187from the enclave a total of 140
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191the warring factions, namely tha
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195In addition Comint can be import
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197policymakers, however. As a resu
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199A second disadvantage of Sigint,
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203125 linguists to provide transla
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217million messages, sent via Intel
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219Zagreb, Morgan, - Svensson was o
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221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOffi
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233have been part of a Bosnian gove
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235get O’Grady out of Bosnian Ser
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237as the Balkans. Two to three yea
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239Comint archive and other archive
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241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in
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243communications traffic of UNPROF
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245Moreover, the NSA is reported to
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247The role of the Netherlands: no
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249made by Krstic and other Bosnian
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251messages, which were intercepted
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253later treetops were used. Throug
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255Conclusions on the interception
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257equipment, planned operations, t
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259made it impossible to follow the
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261community that the situation was
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263commander of the Bosnian-Serb Dr
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271established in 1991, also receiv
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277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in
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2792. What instruments were availab
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283and has provided policy-makers w
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2953. With whom was imagery intelli
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303Mostar and loitered in Zepa area
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305Albright shows the photosOn 10 A
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307was taken some time in 1999, eve
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313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an
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315gathered intelligence, then it m
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317the VRS attack should aim to tak
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319In January 1995 a European intel
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