C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

114A few MIS/Army workers admitted that there were great differences between the MIS/CO andparts of the MIS/Army. Sections of the MIS/Army leadership were actually in favour of morecollaboration, but that was not true of everyone by a long way. Others continued to attend to theinterests of the Army’s Commander-in-Chief, and not the interest of a single MIS, as the law required.An example of the parochialism that prevailed: the European Bureau had no access of its own toLOCE, the system for intelligence liaison between the NATO countries. This was not permitted by theMIS/Army leadership. However, European Bureau staff were not allowed access to the MIS/CO viathe LOCE system to check their own intelligence. There were constant competence disputes. Themutual divisions between the MISs meant that raw intelligence sometimes ‘stranded’. These sourcesdenied that this was also the case with Srebrenica. But in general there was a fierce level of competitionbetween the individual MISs, with the MIS/CO, and even within the MIS/Army. For instance, theMIS/Air Force was not happy if the MIS/Army discussed helicopters in an analysis. The MIS/AirForce and the MIS/Navy also distanced themselves from each other. 527Other staff and former staff at the MIS/Army admitted frankly that in this period they attendedfirst and foremost to the interests of their Commander-in-Chief, but at the same time they painted amilder picture of the poor relationships outlined above. While accepting that there were sometimesprofessional differences of opinion with the MIS/CO, these sources described the collaboration asotherwise going well. It was confirmed that raw intelligence was not always passed on and that theMIS/Army functioned as a filter, but, according to these MIS/Army employees, information neverstranded if the impression existed that the MIS/CO did not have it. Partner information was alwayspassed on. 528A third group challenged the idea that the collaboration around 1995 was not as good as itcould have been. According to them, absolutely no intelligence was held back by MIS/Army; it waseven the case that more had been reported than was strictly necessary. 529 Officers from this last groupwere prepared to admit that Bureau A-1 (including the Situation Centre) was in a better informationposition, because there was more material available to the MIS/Army than the MIS/CO. However,according to them, intelligence was definitely made available in the form of analysis: the MIS/Armynever ‘sat’ on it. The MIS/CO’s lone analyst did not entirely agree with this: because the rawintelligence was not supplied, the MIS/CO analyst could not form his own balanced view, and he wasforced to trust blindly in the MIS/Army analyses. This made the MIS/CO (and in particular their oneBalkans analyst) dependent on what the MIS/Army supplied.Relationships at the topCollaboration at the very highest level between the heads of the MIS/CO and the three MISs of theindividual branches of the Armed Forces did not proceed as well as it might have. The managementmeeting was held every two weeks. This was where the MIS/CO met the other MISs. The managementmeeting was actually a constant competence battle. 530 Those involved stated that it boiled down to thefact that the MIS/CO served a different interest: that of the Minister. The MIS/Army looked to itsCommander-in-Chief, rather than the Minister. 531 This was not all that strange, because the heads of theMISs had to return to their respective Armed Forces units. According to one person involved ‘youdidn’t even entertain the idea’ of going against your own Commander-in-Chief because it could damageyour career. The absolute priority within the MIS/Army was to inform the Army to the best of yourability. Only once this duty had been fulfilled did the Minister become part of the equation. 532527 Confidential interviews (21 ) , ( 31 ) and ( 37).528 Confidential interview (23).529 Confidential interviews (22 ) , ( 23 ) , ( 24 ) and ( 28 ) and ( 36).530 Confidential interview (24).531 Confidential interview (36).532 Confidential interviews (27 ) , ( 28 ) , ( 35 ) , ( 36 ) and ( 37).