annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Animal Species." J. Polit. Econ., 81:950-961.
In this paper, a simple mathematical model for the commercial
exploitation of a natural animal population is constructed and analyzed. The
model takes into account the response of the population to harvesting
pressure, the increasing harvesting costs associated with decreasing
population levels, and the preference of the harvesters for present over
future revenues. The principle conclusion of the analysis is that, depending
on certain easily stated biological and economic conditions, extermination of
the entire population may appear as the most attractive policy, even to an
individual resource owner.
Clark, Colin W. (1979). "Towards a Predictive Model for the Economic
Regulation of Commercial Fisheries." Resources Paper No. 40,
Department of Economics, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5.
A model of the commercial fishery, incorporating the microeconomic
decisions of individual vessel operation, is developed and employed to predict
the consequences of various methods of regulation, including: (i) total catch
quotas; (ii) limited entry; (iii) taxes on catch (or effort); (iv) allocated
catch (or effort) quotas. Among the principal predictions of the analysis
are: (a) total catch quotas do not improve the economic performance of an
open-access fishery; (b) limited entry results in distortion of inputs unless
every input is controlled; (c) taxes and allocated transferrable catch quotas
are theoretically equivalent to one another in terms of economic efficiency,
and both are capable in principle of optimizing exploitation of the commonproperty
fishery.
Clark, Colin W. (1980). "Towards a Predictive Model for the Economic
Regulation of Commercial Fisheries." Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci.,
37:1111-1129.
A model of the commercial fishery, incorporating the microeconomic
decisions of individual vessel operation, is developed and employed to predict
the consequences of various methods of regulation, including: (i) total catch
quotas; (ii) vessel licenses; (iii) taxes on catch (or effort); (iv) allocated
catch (or effort) quotas. Among the principal predictions of the analysis
are: (a) total catch quotas do not improve the economic performance of an open
access fishery; (b) limited entry results in distortion of inputs unless every
input is controlled; (c) taxes and allocated transferable catch quotas are
theoretically equivalent to one another in terms of economic efficiency, and
both are capable in principle of optimizing exploitation of the common
property fishery.
Clark, Colin W. (1980). "Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery
Resources: a Game-Theoretic Analysis." Chapter 7 in P.T. Liu
(ed.) Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, New York:
Plenum Press.
This paper addresses the case of limited access in a fishery where there
are N sole owners of the resource whose inputs are constrained under various
limited access management scenarios.
Clark, Colin W. (1985). The Effect of Fishermen s Quotas on Expected Catch
Rates. Marine Resource Economics, 1(4):419-427.
Fishermen s quotas have the effect of truncating catches at the catch
limit. Hence the expected catch is smaller than the quota. A simple search
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