annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Findings of a global study and an interregional workshop on the economic
and financial viability of the most common fishing craft and gear
combinations. In spite of fully and sometimes over-exploited fishery
resources, marine capture fisheries in most cases are an economically and
financially viable undertaking which generates sufficient revenue to cover the
cost of deprecation as well as the opportunity cost of capital to generate
funds for reinvestment in addition to employment, income, and foreign exchange
earnings.
Levhari, David and Nissan Liviatan (1977). "Notes on Hotelling's
Economics of Exhaustible Resources." Canadian Journal of
Economics, 10(2):177-192.
The paper provides some extensions of Hotelling's fundamental paper on
the economic theory of exhaustible resources. One of the main modifications
introduced in the paper concerns the assumption of complete versus incomplete
exhaustion of the resource. Under complete exhaustion the concept of full
marginal cost must include a term that reflects the alternative cost of
producing an extra unit at the terminal time. Under incomplete exhaustion
this term vanishes. To derive these results, we present a novel formula for
the full marginal cost of extracting exhaustible resources. Also, the
principle that marginal profit has to increase over time exponentially at a
rate equal to the interest rate (r percent rule) is shown to be valid only
under special conditions. The modifications to this rule are discussed.
Levhari, David and Leonard J. Mirman (1980). "The Great Fish War: An
Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution." The Bell Journal
of Economics, 11:649-661.
In recent years there have been numerous international conflicts about
fishing rights. These conflicts are wider in scope than those captured by the
model presented in this paper. Yet the model sheds light on the economic
implications of these conflicts as well as on the implications of other
duopolistic situations in which the decisions of the participants affect the
evolution of an underlying population of interest. Our model has two basic
features: the underlying population changes as a result of the actions of both
participants, and each participant takes account of the other's actions. This
strategic aspect is studied, for an example, by using the concept of a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which each participant's reaction depends on the
stock of fish and not on previous behavior. Thus, the model is a discretetime
analog of a differential game. The paper examines the dynamic and steady
state properties of the fish population that results from the interactions of
the participants.
Levhari, David, Ron Michener, and Leonard J. Mirman (1981). "Dynamic
Programming Models of Fishing: Competition." The American Economic
Review, 71(4):649-661.
In this paper a simple framework will be provided in which many
important results new to the literature can be derived. One bonus of this
approach is that much of the previous literature can be organized and
rationalized. The simplicity of the mathematics has the effect of revealing
the underlying economic intuition of the subject. Throughout the paper the
self renewing resource will be referred to as fish. However, it should be
clear that the analysis is perfectly general in that it can be applied to any
self renewing resource. In fact, by specializing the production function, and
elementary exposition of the theory of exhaustible resources is implicit.
Lewis, Earl J., Frederick G. Kern, Aaron Rosenfield, Stuart A. Stevens,
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