annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

studies are used to illustrate that losses occurred even though in each case
large aggregate gains could be achieved from reaching agreement.
Libecap, Gary D. and Ronald N. Johnson (1980). "Legislating Commons:
The Navajo Tribal Council and the Navajo Range." Economic Inquiry,
18:69-86.
The article argues that chronic overgrazing on the Navajo Reservation is
the result of policies of the BIA and the Tribal Council. In support of that
hypothesis the paper outlines the nature of property rights to grazing land on
the Reservation. It shows that BIA and Tribal Council actions have led to the
proliferation of small herds since 1933. Small herds increase the resource
costs of establishing and enforcing property rights, and they increase the
political costs of requiring compliance with grazing rules. Statistical tests
reveal a close relationship between herd size and overstocking of the range.
The paper concludes that in the absence of the constraints of a private
property system, it may be necessary for an outside agency to regulate grazing
to avoid the problem of the Commons.
Libecap, Gary D. and Steven N. Wiggins (1984). "Contractual Responses
to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production."
American Economic Review, 74(1):87-98.
This paper addresses the impact of the number and heterogeneity of
parties on contracting success by isolating firm differences that lead to
differing bargaining positions and by showing the high degree of concentration
necessary to complete contracts. We analyze firm bargaining to mitigate rent
dissipation from competitive production on five common oil pools where
contracting success varied sharply. On some fields, agreements were quickly
reached and effectively enforced, while on others compliance was never
achieved. We show the firm heterogeneities that led to different bargaining
positions, and calculate the level of concentration necessary for private
contracting success.
Lichtenberg, Erik and David Zilberman (1987). "Regulation of Marine
Contamination under Environmental Uncertainty: Shellfish
Contamination in California." Marine Resource Economics, 4:211-
225.
We develop a model of regulation of environmental risks in a
heterogeneous industry when policy makers are sensitive to uncertainties about
the processes generating the risks. Optimal source reduction capacity is
shown to vary according to site suitability. Optimal source reduction
capacity and the implicit value of risk reduction increase as risk standards
become more stringent and as aversion to uncertainty grows. Taxes are more
equitable than standards whenever the emissions generating the risks are allor-nothing.
Lin, Biing-Hwan, Richard S. Johnston, and R. Bruce Rettig (1986). "U.S.
Demand for Selected Groundfish Products, 1967-80: Comment."
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(4):1021-1024.
Criticism of the Tsoa, Schrank, and Roy (1982) demand for groundfish
article.
Lin, Biing-Hwan, Hugh S. Richards, and Joseph M. Terry (1988). "An
Analysis of the Ex-vessel Demand for Pacific Halibut." Marine
Resource Economics, 4:305-314.
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