annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

the fixed costs. The fixed costs in this model are essentially the costs of
entering the fishery. These may be in terms of foregone opportunity costs or
in terms of direct costs of entering such as the costs of fuel and crew time
to move from the home port to the fishery.
Boyce, John R. (1988). "An Econometric Model of Entry and Exit in a
Fishery." Draft report, Department of Economics, University of
Alaska, Fairbanks, Fairbanks, Alaska, 99775.
A set of simple behavioral relationships are postulated that may be used
to determine the number of agents who will actively participate in the fishery
at any moment in time and the spatial distribution of the agents over a
fishery with multiple locations. These relationships are then used to develop
a switching regression model that predicts the participation rates and
distribution for the British Columbia Salmon fishery from the observed data of
catch and effort. A crowding externality, a stock externality, and costs
increasing from most to least efficient are incorporated into the model. The
results of the model estimation are not provided.
Boyce, John R. (1991). "The Economics of Bycatch Regulation in the
North Pacific." Draft report, Department of Economics, University
of Alaska, Fairbanks, Fairbanks, Alaska, 99775.
The North Pacific groundfish fishery is modeled to determine the impact
of ITQ and penalty box management schemes on firm bycatch levels. It is the
heterogeneity of the fishery and the fact that decisions are made in the
political process that drives the selection of institutions over common
property resources. I should come as no surprise then that when the industry
was faced with a real choice of how to deal with the problem, that it chose to
implement a system that most closely resembled the status quo.
Boyce, John R. (1992). "Individual Transferable Quotas and Production
Externalities in a Fishery." Natural Resource Modeling, 6(4):385-
408.
This paper determines the conditions under which an individual
transferable quota (ITQ) system will cause fishermen to engage in cost
decreasing, rather than cost increasing, competition. If there are production
externalities (e.g., congestion or stock externalities) present, the market
price of a quota will not be fully reflected in these externalities. Thus,
fishermen will not fully internalize the externalities in their effort
decisions. Even if there are no production externalities, an individual
fisherman imposes costs on others under open access by removing a fish that
was available to all fishermen. An ITQ system allows the individual who
values that fish most to obtain the right to harvest the fish, so each
fisherman must internalize the full social cost. Thus, an ITQ system is
capable of solving the common property externality but not the production
externalities in a fishery.
Boyce, John R. (1993). "Using Participation Data to Estimate Fishing
Costs for Commercial Salmon Fisheries in Alaska." Presented at
the International Conference on Fisheries Economics, Os, Norway,
May 26-28.
Using the number of fishermen participating in a particular opening as a
proxy for net revenues, estimates of fishing costs can be estimated using
total revenues. The results are used to estimate producer surplus for each of
nine fisheries for the 1990 season.
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