annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Cheung (1970) shows that externalities arise when exclusive property
rights are absent. Cheung and others argue that the presence or absence of
exclusive rights depends on the costs of defining and enforcing exclusivity.
This paper explores this issue in greater depth with a formal model of
fisheries law enforcement to show how fishing firms behave and fishery
policies are affected by costly, imperfect enforcement of fisheries law. This
is achieved by combining standard bioeconomic theory and the economic theory
of crime and punishment (Becker,1968).
Sutinen, Jon G. and John R. Gauvin (1988). "An Econometric Study of
Regulatory Enforcement and Deterrence in the Commercial Inshore
Lobster Fishery of Massachusetts." Prepared for presentation at
the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on the Scientific Foundations
of Rights Based Fishing, Reykjavik, Iceland, June 27 to July 1,
pp. 36.
The inshore commercial lobster fishery of Massachusetts is used to
determine the deterrence effect of enforcement in a rights based fishery. As
predicted by theory, a lobstermen's perceived probability of detection and
conviction affects their violation rate.
Sutinen, J.G., A. Rieser, and J.R. Gauvin (1989). "Compliance and
Enforcement in Northeast Fisheries." A report for the New England
Fishery Management Council, May, pp. 73.
This study seeks to identify practical ways to improve compliance with
federal multispecies and scallop management regulations in the Northeast.
Sutinen, J.G., A. Rieser, and J.R. Gauvin (1990). "Measuring and
Explaining Noncompliance in Federally Managed Fisheries." Ocean
Development and International Law, 21:335-372.
This article focuses on measuring and explaining noncompliance in
federally managed U.S. fisheries. Novel measurement techniques are used to
characterize the extent and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast
groundfish fishery. According to the authors's estimates, noncompliance
increased substantially in 1986 and remained high through 1988 in the
groundfish fishery. On Georges Bank during 1987, a quarter to half of all
groundfish vessels were identified as frequent violators, committing closed
area violations on about one-third of their trips and using illegal mesh on
nearly all trips. Illegal earnings by a typical frequent violator operating
in the groundfish fishery on Georges Bank amounted to $225,000 per year in
1987.
A theory of compliance in fisheries is developed and applied to explain
the trends and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery.
Biological and economic forces are shown to be dominant causes of the recent
deterioration in compliance. Other contributing factors include weak
sanctions and insufficient enforcement resources. The article concludes with
a prognosis for the fishery and recommendations for improving compliance.
Swallow, Stephen K. (1990). "Depletion of the Environmental Basis for
Renewable Resources: The Economics of Interdependent Renewable and
Nonrenewable Resources." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 19:281-296.
This paper synthesizes familiar theories of nonrenewable and renewable
resource economics in a two sector, partial equilibrium analysis of efficient
trade offs between renewable resource production and environmental
development. The irreversible impacts of coastal zone development provide a
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