annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

or individual transferable quotas (ITQs). This paper argues there are strong
biological, social, and economic reasons to be skeptical that limited entry
will ever solve the fisheries conservation problem. It suggests that the
reasons for the lobster fishery's continued success can be found in the
institutions of virtual user self-governance that have evolved over the years.
Self-governance forces a consensus with regard to the kinds of rules used in
the fishery, assures wide-spread perception of their fairness and efficacy,
and leads to a situation where social sanctions are widely used for their
enforcement. Self-governance in this fishery has led to mutual coercion,
mutually agreed upon and mutually enforced.
Wilson, James( (1994). Self-Governance in the Maine Lobster Fishery. In
Karyn L. Gimbel (ed.) Limiting Access to Marine Fisheries: Keeping the
Focus on Conservation, Center for Marine Conservation and the World
Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.
The Maine lobster fishery has long been described as a classic case of
over fishing - both biologically and economically. To the discomfort of
standard management theory the fishery continues to produce high sustained
yields; as for biological performance it may be one of the best managed
fisheries in the world. This paper suggests that the reasons for the
fishery s continued success can be found in the institutions of virtual user
self-governance that have evolved over the years. Self-governance forces a
consensus about the kinds of rules used in the fishery, assures widespread
perception of their fairness and efficacy, and leads to a situation where
social sanctions are widely used for their enforcement. Self-governance in
this fishery has led to mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon and mutually
enforced.
Wilson, James A. and Ralph Townsend (19??). "Simulation Model of a
Stochastic Multiple Species Fishery System with High Search Costs."
Proposal, Departments of Economics and Physics, University of
Maine, Orono, Maine.
The proposed research uses simulation modeling of multispecies fisheries
systems to reevaluate the desirability of certain management regimes.
Wilson, James A., James M. Acheson, Mark Metcalfe, and Peter Kleban
(1994). "Chaos, Complexity and Community Management of Fisheries."
Marine Policy, 18(4):291-305.
For several decades, fisheries management has been based on stock
recruitment models, leading to policies designed to control the amount of
effort and the quantity of fish caught. This approach has not been notably
successful. In this paper we take the view that this problem arises from the
complex and likely chaotic nature of fisheries. This attribute of fisheries
creates a very difficult and costly information problem, which renders
attempts to control the long term numerical abundance of individual species
virtually impossible. We argue that feasible management must address the
relatively stable parameters of fisheries systems - habitat and basic
biological processes, and that this demands management attention to the fine
as well as the broad scale attributes of the system. Attention to detail at
these differing scales implies the need for a layered or hierarchical
management structure. The need to minimize information costs also suggests an
emphasis on decentralized, community based approaches to management. A review
of the anthropological literature shows that such approaches are common in
many societies.
Wilson, James A., R. Townsend, P. Kelban, S. McKay, and J. French
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