annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

This paper applies elementary public choice theory to explain failures
of fishery management and investigates how alternative financing methods may
be able to correct this form of governmental failure. We argue that who
pays and how they pay for management services influences policies and the
economic performance of a fishery. In most countries, the general treasury
finances nearly 100 percent of the cost of fishery management. This financing
method, we reason, encourages inefficient use of research, decision-making and
enforcement resources and results in poor management of fisheries. Currently
there is a modest trend on the part of a few countries to reduce such
inefficiencies by implementing user charges to recover a significant portion
of the cost of managing their fishery resources. We analyze the economic
efficiency consequences of user charges and other financing methods, and
review the methods of financing fishery management for Australia, Canada,
Denmark, and the United States.
Andersen, Peder, Jon G. Sutinen, and Kathy Cochran (1998). "Paying for
Fishery Management, Economic Implications of Alternative Methods
of Financing Management." Prepared for presentation to the IXth
Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics
and Trade, Tromso, Norway, 8-11 October(Revised).
This paper applies elementary public choice theory to explain failures
of fishery management and investigates how alternative financing methods may
be able to correct this form of governmental failure. We argue that who
pays and how they pay for management services influences policies and the
economic performance of a fishery. In most countries, the general treasury
finances nearly 100 percent of the cost of fishery management. This financing
method, we reason, encourages inefficient use of research, decision-making and
enforcement resources and results in poor management of fisheries. Currently
there is a modest trend on the part of a few countries to reduce such
inefficiencies by implementing user charges to recover a significant portion
of the cost of managing their fishery resources. We analyze the economic
efficiency consequences of user charges and other financing methods, and
review the methods of financing fishery management for Australia, Canada,
Denmark, and the United States.
Anderson, E.D. (1980). "Analysis of Various Sources of Pelagic Shark
Catches in the Northwest and Western Central Atlantic Ocean and
Gulf of Mexico." Laboratory Reference Document No. 79-56,
National Marine Fisheries Service, Northeast Fisheries Center,
Woods Hole Laboratory, Woods Hole, MA, February, 37 pp.
The purpose of this paper is to present (1) reported commercial catches
of pelagic sharks in the U.S. FCZ in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, (2)
estimates of U.S. recreational catch, (3) estimates of bycatch in the U.S. and
Canadian swordfish longline fisheries, (4) estimates of bycatch in the foreign
squid trawl fishery in the Northwest Atlantic, and (5) estimates of bycatch in
the Japanese tuna longline fishery. Other possible sources of bycatch are
mentioned and the general limitations and inadequacies of the entire data base
are discussed.
Anderson, Eric E. (1986). "Taxes vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries
Under Uncertainty: A Hybrid Discrete-Time Continuous-Time Model."
Marine Resource Economics, 3(3):183-207.
There is a wide variety of regulatory instruments available for
achieving economic efficiency in markets where externalities exist. All of
them, when correctly designed, are equally effective, provided that complete
information is available and that adjustments to the level of the instruments
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