annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Hamalainen, Raimo P., Jukka Ruusunen, and Veijo Kaitala (1990).
"Cartels and Dynamic Contracts in Sharefishing." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 19:175-192.
This paper studies a principal-agent model of a fishery, where
cooperative vessel owners hire unorganized fishermen to operate the vessels.
On each vessel fishermen's remuneration is a share of the value of the catch.
The results show that harvest shares of myopic fishermen will be reduced when
cartels are established. Intertemporal optimization of the resource use by
the cartel is accompanied by the problem of the cartel's viability. Share
contracts are traditionally motivated by risk sharing and by the avoidance of
labor monitoring. The results of this paper suggest new important reasons for
the commonness of share contracts in fishing. Sharefishing is a self-adaptive
and time consistent remuneration system as it automatically accommodates
differences in individual crews' labor supplies due to differences in
fishermen's skills and cost factors. An essential result found that supports
harvest sharing is the relative simplicity of the social management policy;
optimal regulation is accomplished by a constant subsidy on the price of fish.
The subsidy policy is time consistent and does not change as the stock level
changes. The paper also addresses conditions under which stock extinction
does not occur in sharefishing.
Hamilton, Marcia S. and Stephen W. Huffman (1997). Cost-Earnings Study of
Hawaii s Small Boat Fishery, 1995-1996. SOEST 97-01, JIMAR
Contribution 97-314, Pelagic Fisheries Research Program, Joint Institute
for Marine and Atmospheric Research, 1000 Pope Road, Honolulu, HI, 102
pp.
The focus of the study was Hawaii s 1995-1996 small pelagic fishery.
Vessel owners and operators were surveyed through both in-person and mail-back
surveys. Information was obtained on 569 small boat fishermen. Data includes
information on vessel operations and characteristics, investment and fixed
costs, trip costs, annual catches, sales and gross revenue, as well as
operator demographics. Surveys were stratified into four groups based on
fishermen s motivations and reliance on fishing income: full-time fishermen
were defined as those who reported receiving over 50% of their income from
fishing profits, part-time fishermen received 50% or less of their income from
fishing, expense fishermen sold fish only to cover trip costs, and
recreational fishermen did not sell any part of their catch over the previous
12 months. Clear differences were evident among groups. Fishing intensity
(number of trips taken over the previous 12 months), catch, and gross revenue
were all found to decrease as operators reliance on fishing income decreased
(from full-time to recreational). A majority of fishermen reported using more
than one gear type, however, full-time fishermen reported doing more
handlining relative to trolling when compared to other groups. Average trip
costs were similar across groups, with full-time fishermen spending more on
ice and bait than others. An examination of the data on pelagic vessels by
vessel length was also carried out. Sixty-six percent of the completed
surveys belonged to vessels between 16 and 24 feet in length overall. In
general, investment, costs, and catches rose along with vessel size.
Operators of larger vessels reported a greater emphasis on handlining than did
smaller vessels but all sizes utilized multiple gear types during the previous
12 months.
Hamilton, Marcia S., Rita E. Curtis, and Michael D. Travis (1996). Cost-
Earnings Study of the Hawaii-Based Domestic Longline Fleet. SOEST 96-
03, JIMAR Contribution 96-300, Pelagic Fisheries Research Program, Joint
Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research, 1000 Pope Road, Honolulu,
HI, 59 pp.
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