annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

the shape of this production function, as well as the demand and effort cost
functions. The fishing effort approach is integrated with neoclassical
production function analysis where labor and capital produce an effort
frontier production function that can be estimated for selected Norwegian
fisheries. Optimal vessel size and capital intensity can be estimated.
Fishing vessels appear to be undersized but not too capital intensive.
Hannesson, Rognvaldur (1983). "Optimal Harvesting of Ecologically
Interdependent Fish Species." Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 10:329-345.
The optimal exploitation of a two-species predator-prey system is
considered, using Lotka-Volterra type equations. Due to the density
dependence of ecological efficiency, both species should be harvested
simultaneously over a range of relative prices. Beyond the limits of this
price range, either the prey species should be utilized indirectly by
harvesting the predator, or the predator should be eliminated to maximize the
prey yield. Neglecting harvesting costs, the simultaneous harvest of prey and
predators requires that a unit of prey biomass increase in value by being
"processed" by predators. Certain results from single species fishery models
are shown not to apply to multispecies models. These are as follows: (i)
Optimal regulation of a free access fishery may call for subsidizing instead
of taxing the harvest of predator species. (ii) Increasing the discount rate
may, at "moderate" levels, imply that the optimal standing stock of biomass
increases instead of decreasing. (iii) a rising price of a falling cost per
unit fishing effort of a species may raise and not lower the optimal standing
stock of that species.
Hannesson, Rognvaldur (1984). "Fisheries Management and Uncertainty."
Marine Resource Economics, 1(1):89-96.
This paper explores likely changes in the types and extent of
uncertainty resulting from increased regulation of fisheries. Specifically,
fisheries management may be a principal source of uncertainty, and
institutional uncertainty may be substituted for the uncertainty of nature.
Hannesson, Rognvaldur (1985). "The Effects of a Fishermen's Monopoly in
the Market for Unprocessed Fish." Marine Resource Economics,
2(1):75-85.
This paper considers the effects of granting a fishermen's sales
organization exclusive rights to sell unprocessed fish. On the assumption
that the fishermen's monopoly is able to discriminate between plants and end
use alternatives in its pricing policy, the conditions for profit maximization
are derived and compared with the conditions for social efficiency. It is
found that the monopoly would be efficient if its costs for obtaining the fish
are identical to the social costs, the marginal processing cost is constant,
and either the price of the finished product is constant or the product is
exported so that consumer's surplus is not a part of the social benefit. A
fishermen's monopoly may thus achieve the objectives of an export cartel.
When the marginal processing cost is rising the monopoly will over conserve
the fish resource, provided that its cost of providing the fish is not
sufficiently below the social cost. Finally, the analysis is extended to the
special case in which processors have established a price discriminating
monopoly in the market for the finished products but distribute the resulting
profit through higher accounting prices while leaving individual processors to
decide how much fish to buy for processing. This system passes the benefits
from price discrimination in the markets for finished products on to the
fishermen's monopoly.
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