annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Anonymous (1995). "Rents and Taxes in an Individual Transferable Quota
Fishery." Draft manuscript, Marine Resource Economics.
Taxing pure rents is usually considered the least distortionary method
for raising revenues. In the literature on fishery economics, the term "rent"
is regularly employed, suggesting that pure rents exist in that sector.
Indeed, with the recent development of individual transferable quotas, the
resulting market value of quota has been treated as reflecting pure resource
rents. In this paper, the view that the market value of quota represents a
pure rent that can be readily extracted in a nondistortionary manner by the
taxing authority is challenged.
Anonymous (1995). "Shrimp License Management." In An Act Relating to
the Authority to Establish License Management Programs for
Commercial Fishing, Section 1, Chapter 77, Parks and Wildlife
Code, Subchapter F, January.
A law proposed by the Texas State Legislature requiring transferable
licenses for inshore, commercial bay and bait shrimp boats.
Anonymous (1995).
Spatial Modeling Environment References. Unknown source.
A list of references to aid in the development of ecological and
economic systems models using spatial modeling techniques.
Anonymous (1996). Coordination of United States and International Efforts to
Improve the Management of Fishing Capacity. Proposal, National Marine
Fisheries Service, 1315 East-West Highway, Silver Spring, MD.
This paper identifies and suggests coordination for U.S. and
international efforts planned or in process to improve the management of
fishing capacity.
Anonymous (1996). "Economics Without Free-Disposal: The Problem of
Quota-Induced Discarding in Heterogenous Fisheries." Draft
manuscript, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Individual quota (IQ) programs are a promising and increasingly common
means of regulating fisheries. This paper examines how profit maximizing
fishers respond to different types of IQ programs in fisheries where many
types of fish are harvested simultaneously. The paper first specifies a joint
production function for the fishery. Using this technology, the responses of
profit maximizing fishers to different IQ programs are analyzed. This
analysis shows first that the most common types of individual quota program
can induce discarding, and second that of all possible individual quota
programs, only those that regulate the value of harvest never induce
discarding. Since discarded fish have a high mortality rate, value-based
individual quota programs are superior to their more conventional counterparts
in that they waste fewer fish. These results are driven by the fact that the
fishing technology examined here does not satisfy a free-disposal
assumption. Since this free disposal assumption is ubiquitous in production
theory, and not obviously true, the framework developed herein is useful for
analyzing a broad class of problems involving joint production.
Anonymous (1996). An Overview of the Impacts on the Biological Status of
Sharks. Draft Animals Committee Discussion Paper Pursuant to Cites
Resolution Conf. 9.17, August, 7 pp.
The executive summary from a paper that provides an overview of the
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