annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

with fishery management systems in Iceland beginning in 1975. Many economists
and others predicted that the fishing fleet would be reduced as a result of
the new regimes, but this has not happened to the extent anticipated. Local
governments have traditionally had a stake in the Icelandic fisheries. The
motives of local municipalities might conflict with the motives pursued by the
fishery managers. A theoretical model is developed to understand the
consequences of local politicians involvement in the quota market.
Furthermore, it is indicated that the degree of ease with which the less
effective fishing firms find ways to circumvent the profitability consequences
of the management regime depends on the initial allocation of fishing rights.
Matulich, Scott C. (1993). "Rationalizing Comprehensive
Rationalization: Reconsidering Efficiency and Equity Implications
of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) in North Pacific
Fisheries." Agricultural Economics Staff Paper A.E. 93-5,
Department of Agricultural Economics, Washington State University,
Pullman, WA, June, 30 pp.
The allocation of quota shares to harvesters is examined when vertically
integrated firms exist in the fishery. Allocation to processors is seen as
more efficient that share allocation solely to harvesters when a Pareto
optimality condition is imposed on the management regulation. The author
contends that independent processors who expand capacity to handle landing
gluts from open access fisheries should also receive a share of the quota
allocation if fixed capital is included in a dynamic analysis of the fisheries
adjustment path. This "2-pie" allocation system reduces transaction costs and
promotes long run efficiency.
Matulich, Scott C. (1993). "Reconsidering Equity and Efficiency
Implications of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) in North
Pacific Fisheries." Department of Agricultural Economics,
Washington State University, Pullman, WA, November, 30 pp.
The allocation of quota shares to harvesters is examined when vertically
integrated firms exist in the fishery. Allocation to processors is seen as
more efficient that share allocation solely to harvesters when a Pareto
optimality condition is imposed on the management regulation. The author
contends that independent processors who expand capacity to handle landing
gluts from open access fisheries should also receive a share of the quota
allocation if fixed capital is included in a dynamic analysis of the fisheries
adjustment path. This "2-pie" allocation system reduces transaction costs and
promotes long run efficiency.
Max, Wendy and Dale E. Lehman (1988). "A Behavioral Model of Timber
Supply." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
15:71-86.
A dynamic behavioral model of timber supply is developed. The diverse
motivation of forest owners is recognized and the implications for optimal
harvest patterns is explored. This model is particularly relevant for the
non-industrial private forest (NIPF) sector, and has possible uses for public
forest management. Properties of the optimal NIPF timber supply curve are
established, and the effects of various taxes are examined. To explore a more
structured model, simulations are conducted based upon data from a typical
redwood region. The projections provide indicative results for tax and other
timber land policies. These results are seen to depend crucially on the forms
of the landowner's utility function and upon the function relating standing
timber to non-income outputs of the forest. Directions for needed empirical
research are then indicated.
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