annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

understanding of alternative regimes produces eight criteria. These are
applied to the choice between two systems of restricting entry: a tax and
quotas. The transactions costs of the two systems are also investigated. The
hypothesis is formed that the eight criteria, plus expected transactions
costs, give the edge to a quota system; but this is only illustrative of the
approach.
Scott, Anthony (ed.) (1985). Progress in Natural Resource Economics.
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
This volume attempts to meet the obvious need for intensive research on
resource topics based on a Canadian Council program grant. It surveys the
fields of renewable and nonrenewable resources, institutions, and ideologies.
Scott, Anthony (1988). "Development of Property in the Fishery."
Marine Resource Economics, 5:289-311.
To what extent is the recently invented individual catch quota a form of
real property right? This article introduces six quantitative characteristics
of all personal interests in land and natural resources. It is shown that
medieval fishing rights had some of these characteristics, but these rights
were not developed in the common law of property. The article then turns to
modern regulatory licenses and catch quotas and examines the extent to which
they embody property characteristics. In a digression, the obstacles to
political acceptance of the individual fishery property concept are surveyed.
The paper concludes by suggesting that catch quotas may develop into shares in
the fish stock or biomass itself.
Scott, Anthony (1989). "Conceptual Origins of Rights Based Fishing."
Pages 11-38 in P.A. Neher, R. Arnason, and N. Mollett (eds.)
Rights Based Fishing. Dordrecht: Academic Publishers.
Recent innovations in quota rights are only a stage in the progression
to private ownership of fisheries.
Scott, Anthony (1993). "Obstacles to Fishery Self-Government." Marine
Resource Economics, 8(3):187-199.
This paper uses some aspects of modern organization and management
theory to suggest what difficulties arise with the introduction of self
government in fisheries. Recent studies are used to shed light on the
characteristics of fisheries that already have apparently successful schemes
of self government. A simple question is asked: if for a fishery under
regulation it had already been decided, in principle, that self government
should be tried, which obstacles would be most serious? Among the suggested
answers are deficient information, excessive numbers of fishermen and
fishermen heterogeneity. The least serious of these are the distributional
problems.
Scott, Frank A. (1983). "A Note on Uncertain Input Prices, Profit Risk,
and the Rate-Of-Return Regulated Firm." Land Economics,
59(2):247-254.
The themes of lagged regulation and uncertainty are brought together in
this paper because existing studies of rate of return regulation and
uncertainty have focused predominately on demand or revenue uncertainty, while
input price uncertainty has been virtually ignored.Rapid changes in input
prices have brought the issue of regulatory lag to the forefront. This and
the regulatory commissions response of moving toward continuous regulation
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