annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

(1990). "Managing unpredictable resources: traditional policies
applied to chaotic populations." Ocean and Shoreline Management,
13, pp. 179-197.
Conventional theory for the management of living ocean resources assumes
a predictable link between current management actions and the future state of
managed populations. As a practical matter, however, it is very hard to
establish this kind of predictable relationship. It is possible that the
dynamics of these populations exhibit chaotic variation. This paper addresses
the question of appropriate management policies in a regime characterized by
chaotic population dynamics. The problem is approached through a bioeconomic
simulator that has chaotic properties. With light fishing, policies that
alter the conditions of fishing perform better than policies dependent upon
population predictions. A lightweight paper that discusses the project in
general terms. It does not present the model or any explanation of how the
results were derived. The dissertation by Susan McKay (?) may be a better
source for the actual model used in this paper.
Wilson, James R. (1997). Peer Review of the Economics of Management
Strategies for Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. Draft report for U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
National Marine Fisheries Service, 63 du Sommet est, Rimouski, Quebec
G5L 7B5, Canada, September, 62 pp.
A review of the social science analyses relating to red snapper
management of the directed fishery, the recreational fishery, and the
incidental catch issue associated with the shrimp fishery.
Wilson, James R. and Rebecca Lent (1993). "Economic Perspective and the
Evolution of Fisheries Management Methods: Towards Subjectivist
Methodology." Presented at the International Conference on
Fisheries Economics, Os, Norway, May 26-28.
This paper attempts to explain, using neo-institutional economics, why
some of the most vaulted and comprehensive management programs have been
failures while others have been qualified successes. It is argued that the
failures often occur with programs that take a more constructivist approach to
public management, proposing integrated solutions to common pool problems that
surpass the ability of managers and managed to foresee and predict outcomes.
Wilson, James R. and Rebecca Lent (1994). "Economic Perspective and the
Evolution of Fisheries Management Methods: Towards Subjectivist
Methodology." Marine Resource Economics, 9(4):353-373.
Some perspectives of neo-institutional economics are used to reexamine
the common pool fishery. Applications of property rights theory in models
simulating the evolution of fisheries management suggest that even in the
presence of positive information and transactions costs (ITCs), resource users
may have incentives to sequentially negotiate rules of common pool use. Such
a result might imply that fisheries managers should be more concerned with
ITCs than inefficiencies due to overcapitalization. This impression is
further reinforced in collective choice examples taken from U.S. fisheries
management. These comparative cases of public decision making in New England
and Alaska suggest that variations in the style of public management as well
as other aspects such as fleet heterogeneity might cause variations in
management effectiveness. These variations in effectiveness may be related to
the ITC environment internal to the public agencies, as well as to the
external ITC environment they face.
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