annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Service, Restricted Access Management Division, P.O. Box 21668, Juneau,
Alaska, March, 25 pp.
This report contains general information about the IFQ program s history
and main elements, a review of the performance of the program and the fleet
during the 1996 season, a discussion of the numbers, rules, and regulations
that will govern the 1997 season, a discussion of ideas for program changes,
and a variety of charts and tables in the appendix.
Smith, Philip J. (1998). 1998 Report to the Fleet. National Marine
Fisheries Service, Restricted Access Management Division, P.O. Box
21668, Juneau, Alaska, February, 25 pp.
This report contains general information about the IFQ program s history
and main elements, a review of the performance of the program and the fleet
during the 1997 and 1998 seasons, a discussion of the IFQ program, such as
issuance of quota shares, transfer activity, and consolidation. Information
on Magnuson/Stevens Act Amendments, IRS tax tips, and the IFQ program on the
Internet is also provided.
Smith, Suzanna and Michael Jepson (1993). "Big Fish, Little Fish:
Politics and Power in the Regulation of Florida's Marine
Resources." Social Problems, 40 (1):?-?.
This paper draws on interviews with 70 couples in commercial fishing
families to examine the relative influence of objective scientific information
as opposed to political and social considerations on the management and
allocation of marine resources. Decisions about the regulation of commercial
fishing are influenced by Florida's economic dependence on tourism and related
development and competition for control of the state's coastal resources.
Class, power, and bureaucratic knowledge all have a part in the decisions that
shape the regulation of Florida's inshore net fishing industry.
Smith, Terrance (1997). Solving the Bycatch Problem: An Economic
Perspective. In Solving Bycatch, Considerations for Today and
Tomorrow, Alaskan Sea Grant College Program Report No. 96-03, University
of Alaska, Fairbanks, Alaska, 322 pp.
Because most fishing gear is completely selective, fishing operations
result in the incidental catch of species not targeted. This incidental
catch, or bycatch, can occur in two contexts: (1) in a mix species or
multispecies fishery where the species caught are managed as a unit or by a
single management agency, or (2) in fisheries where the bycatch of species
regulated by a different management entity must be minimized. From an
economic perspective, the first kind of bycatch can be dealt with using
traditional management tools. Regulating the second kind of bycatch, however,
creates additional costs. The bycatch fishery experiences control costs -
foregone revenue from the loss of target species that might have been taken,
and in addition, the increased operational cost associated with avoiding
bycatch. The other fishery experiences impact cost - foregone revenue
because the bycatch fishery reduced the potential yield form the fishery.
This second class of bycatch control problem is common and exists, for
example, in the groundfish fisheries off Alaska, where the bycatch of halibut,
red king crab, Tanner crab, herring, and salmon is limited. It also exists in
the gillnet fisheries for groundfish off New England, where time/area closures
limit target catch to reduce harbor porpoise bycatch mortality. Controlling
bycatch is thus another allocation issue and amenable to cost/benefit
analysis. An examination of current bycatch management systems in the Alaskan
groundfish fisheries and the northeast groundfish gillnet fisheries illustrate
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