annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Coalition for Marine Conservation, Inc., Savannah, Georgia.
Habitat can no longer be ignored in decisions that affect recreational
fisheries. Habitat must be protected, enhanced, and restored to develop
recreational fisheries.
Hall, Martin A. (1997). Strategic Issues in Managing Fishery Bycatches.
In Solving Bycatch, Considerations for Today and Tomorrow, Alaskan Sea
Grant College Program Report No. 96-03, University of Alaska, Fairbanks,
Alaska, 322 pp.
A brief analysis is made of the strategies that can be used to reduce
bycatches in fisheries. They fall under two basic types: reduction of the
level of effort, and reduction of the average bycatch per unit of effort
(BPUE). The former frequently results in lower catches of the target species.
Reduction in BPUE, on the other hand, may offer a way to mitigate the problems
with fewer negative impacts on the fisheries. Identifying the environmental,
biological, and technological reasons why bycatches happen is the key point of
those strategies that attempt to deal with the problems while at the same time
maintaining the use of the resources involved. Five lines of defense are
identified to try to mitigate or solve bycatch problems. The Tuna-Dolphin
Program of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, is used as a case
study to illustrate different issues. Finally, some of the conditions that
have helped solve this problem are presented. Even though it is clear that
each fishery will have to develop its own set of solutions, there are some
common traits that may help in the search for solutions.
Halstead, John M. and Minkang Zhu (1987). "Managing Risk and
Uncertainty in Agricultural Nonpoint Source Contamination of
Ground Water: Sources and--Solutions (?)." Department of
Agricultural Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Blacksburg, Virginia, June, 25 pp.
This paper describes the nature and sources of uncertainty faced by the
economist attempting to analyze alternative policies for management of
agricultural nonpoint source pollution of ground water. Since the nature of
the nonpoint problem makes many of the techniques used to control point source
pollutants infeasible, approaches to the ground water problem often involve a
modeling component to simulate both physical movement of agricultural
chemicals and decision making of economic units. This paper focuses primarily
on how uncertainty affects this modeling process.
Hamalainen, Raimo P., Jukka Ruusunen, and Veijo Kaitala (1986). "Myopic
Stackelberg Equilibria and Social Coordination in a Share Contract
Fishery." Marine Resource Economics, 3(3):209-235.
A general dynamic model of fishing under harvest share contracts is
developed. Vessel owners hire fishermen to work on the vessels and pay them a
share of the catch and an additional wage. The harvest rate depends on labor
input, capital input, and stock level. Neither of the agents is unionized.
On each vessel we have a principal agent setting where the crews labor input
decisions and vessel owners decisions about harvest shares are based on
myopic optimization. However, in this first analysis of the model risk is not
included in the formulation. The paper concentrates on the incentive effects
and in this framework the reason for a share contract to exist is the
avoidance of transaction costs. In a share contract fishery both labor input
and resource use are inefficient. A detailed analysis of the effectiveness of
different regulation policies is presented.
2 7 3