annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

The bycatch of juvenile fish can be a major problem in fisheries with
small meshed trawls, such as fisheries for shrimp, (Pandalus borealis). A
sorting grid that effectively removes most of the undersized fish has been
developed for shrimp trawls and it is not legal to fish for shrimp in the
Barents Sea without the use of this sorting grid. Apart from this, the
existing catch regulation of the shrimp fishery in the Barents Sea is the
closing of shrimp fisheries on fishing grounds when the bycatch of juvenile
fish exceeds the criteria for allowable bycatch in numbers per ton of shrimp
set by the Norwegian - Russian Fishery Commission.
In this paper, a new method for the calculation of a criteria for
closing shrimp fisheries based on both biological and economic considerations
is established. This bioeconomic approach is an alternative to the existing
biological approach. The main concept in the bioeconomic approach is that if
the expected future value of the bycatch exceeds the value of the shrimp
catches, the shrimp fishery should be closed. In this paper, a joint criteria
for allowable bycatch is developed and calculated, including all the
commercially interesting species whose juveniles are caught as bycatch in the
shrimp fisheries in the Barents Sea.
Vestergaard, Niels (1996). Discard Behavior, Highgrading, and Regulation:
The Case of the Greenland Shrimp Fishery. Marine Resource Economics,
11(4):247-266.
A formal economic analysis of the discarding problem is presented,
focusing on the individual fisherman and the effect of different regulations
on the fisherman s incentives to discard. If the marginal trip profit of an
extra fishing day is greater than the average trip profit in a nonregulated
multispecies or single species/multisize fishery constrainted only by the hold
capacity and the length of the season, the fisherman may have rational
incentives to discard/highgrade. Regulation by TAC does not change the
incentives to discard. However, under individual nontransferable quotas
(INTQs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs), the incentives to discard
increase. The incentives to discard decrease under ITQs compared to INTQs, if
the unit quota price is smaller than the shadow price of the quota. The model
is applied to the Greenland shrimp fishery, where it demonstrates the reported
discard behavior in the fishery. Finally, different regulations of discard
are applied and discussed in the model. The analysis suggests that regulation
of fishing days could be a promising alternative to usual suggested measures
like tax/subsidies and landings obligations.
Vestergaard, Niels (1998). Property Rights Based Regulation of Fishery:
Applications and Theory. Ph.D. Dissertation, ROD Serie, nr. 50,
Okonomisk Institut, Kobenhavns Universitet, December, 92 pp.
A collection of papers on the application of ITQs in the cod, shrimp,
multispecies, and Danish fisheries as well as sunk costs and entry-exit
decisions.
Vieira, Luis Fernando (1987). "Forecasting with Multivariate Time
Series Models: An Application to the Sea Scallop Fishery."
Dissertation, Department of Resource Economics, University of
Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.
The objective of this research is to develop time series forecasting
models for economic variables characterizing the U.S. Atlantic sea scallop
fishery, namely, ex-vessel prices, effort, and landings. The proposal is
included with the dissertation.
Voiland, Michael P., Jr. (1984). "Coastal Fishing Access: Needs And New
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