25.07.2014 Views

annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

programs. This article presents a methodology to estimate harvest sector<br />

efficiency gains in lieu <strong>of</strong> incomplete fleet restructuring. The methodology<br />

is applied to assess the efficiency gains in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and<br />

ocean quahog fishery ITQ program. While roughly 128 vessels harvested clams<br />

under the previous management regime, the analysis suggests that 21-25 vessels<br />

will remain under ITQs. The efficiency gains are estimated to be between<br />

$11.1 million and $12.8 million annually (1990 dollars).<br />

Weninger, Quinn R. and Richard E. Just (1997). An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Transition<br />

From Limited Entry to Transferable Quota: Non-Marshallian Principles for<br />

Fisheries Management. Natural Resource Modeling, 10(1):53-83.<br />

Static analysis shows that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can<br />

dramatically increase economic efficiency comparable to a limited entry (LE)<br />

management by releasing excess capital. However, the transition from LE to<br />

ITQ management presents further efficiency questions. This paper shows that<br />

the rate <strong>of</strong> retirement <strong>of</strong> excess capital is determined by the opportunity cost<br />

<strong>of</strong> holding ITQ harvest rights on cost inefficient vessels. While restructuring<br />

is immediate with perfect foresight delayed exit occurs with uncertainty and<br />

low opportunity costs <strong>of</strong> holding ITQ. Nearly cost-efficient fishers<br />

anticipate increasing their pay<strong>of</strong>f by waiting for higher ITQ prices, e.g.,<br />

game theoretic principles rather than static Marshallian principles apply.<br />

The results raise policy questions about allocating ITQ to incumbent fishers<br />

at no charge. The Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery which<br />

switch from LE to ITQ management in 1990 is analyzed as a case study. Results<br />

show that a large surplus was possible but unattained under LE management but<br />

also that adjustment has been slow and costly, consistent with the results <strong>of</strong><br />

this paper.<br />

Wesney, David (1989). "Applied Fisheries Management Plans: Individual<br />

Transferable Quotas and Input Controls." In Neher, Philip A.,<br />

Ragnar Arnason, and Nina Mollett (eds.). Rights Based Fishing,<br />

Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.<br />

This paper examines two different management systems which have been<br />

applied in recent years to two <strong>of</strong> Australia's major <strong>fisheries</strong>, the southern<br />

bluefin tuna (SBT) fishery and the northern prawn fishery (NPF). These<br />

Australian <strong>fisheries</strong> have been closely managed from the onset <strong>of</strong> commercial<br />

exploitation and have produced good results from both biological and economic<br />

perspectives.<br />

Wespestad, Vidar G. and Joseph M. Terry (1984). "Biological and<br />

Economic Yields for Eastern Bering Sea Walleye Pollock under<br />

Differing Fishing Regimes." North American Journal <strong>of</strong> Fisheries<br />

Management, 4:204-215.<br />

A bioeconomic simulation was conducted to evaluate the alternative<br />

management strategies. The simulation model was an age structured population<br />

model to which economic functions were added. Four alternative fishing<br />

regimes were evaluated in the analysis: the current fishery, a fishery<br />

directed toward small fillet pollock, a fishery directed toward large fillet<br />

pollock, and a fishery directed primarily toward small pollock for fish paste<br />

(surimi). Each fishing regime was simulated over a 20 year period. To<br />

account for stochastic variation in the recruitment function, each fishing<br />

regime was repeated five times.<br />

Wessells, Cathy R (1998). Barriers to International Trade in Fisheries. <br />

Discussion paper prepared for the FAO E-Mail Conference on Fisheries<br />

Trade and Food Security, Department <strong>of</strong> Environmental and Natural<br />

7 2 6

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!