annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Scallop Fishery." Draft report, Northeast Fisheries Science
Center, National Marine Fisheries Service, Woods Hole, MA,
October, 25 pp.
Two phases of rent-seeking in the U.S. Atlantic sea scallop fishery are
described. The phase that began when the Magnuson-Stevens Act was implemented
in 1977 and lasted over 10 years saw harvesters overcapitalize the fishery to
capture residual rents in the public domain. Rents were apparently dissipated
within approximately three years after which the marginal revenue product of
effort remained below the marginal cost of effort given resource abundance
each year. Resource depletion and high fixed costs led to negative average
vessel (accounting) profit during the mid-1980's and throughout the 1990's
due, in part, to non-transferable effort quotas and closed areas beginning in
1994. Despite these dire financial circumstances, however, efforts to develop
property rights in the fishery beginning during the late 1980's have been
stymied by heterogeneities among fishermen, especially the potential
distribution of rents if effort quotas that were implemented by Amendment 4 to
the New England Fishery Management Council s Sea Scallop Fishery management
Plan became transferrable. Estimates of ownership of effort quotas indicate
that 75 percent of the sea scallopers own one or fewer full-time-equivalent
permits compared to 5-10 permits owned by 4 percent of the quota holders. The
paper concludes with a discussion of future prospects in the fishery related
to exclusive areas and sea scallop culture.
Edwards, Steven F. and Glen D. Anderson (1984). "Land Use Conflicts in
the Coastal Zone: An Approach for the Analysis of the Opportunity
Costs of Protecting Coastal Resources." Journal of the
Northeastern Agricultural Economics Council, 14:73-81.
The implicit price (hedonic) equation for the housing market in a
coastal town in southern Rhode Island was estimated using a conditional Box-
Cox maximum likelihood procedure. Linear, log-linear, and semi-log functional
forms were rejected with 95% confidence. Estimates of marginal implicit
prices for water related attributes (view of, frontage on, and proximity to a
coastal salt water pond) derived from these rejected models were quite
different from those determined from the optimal functional form. This result
has important ramifications for public policy, as is shown in an example,
since these attributes were found to be highly valued in the housing market.
Edwards, Steven F. and Cynthia Carlson (1989). "On Estimating
Compensation for Injury to Publicly Owned Marine Resources."
Marine Resource Economics, 6(1):27-42.
The public has an established right to use certain marine resources
including fish stocks, beaches, and marine waters, for certain purposes,
including recreational fishing. Rights in public resources are held in trust
by federal and state governments for the public, both now and in the future.
Given public rights, we not only argue that minimum willingness-to-acceptcompensation
(WTA) is the theoretically correct measure of economic damages
when a publicly owned marine resource is injured, but that it is, in fact,
feasible to measure WTA and therefore, WTA should be used to estimate
compensation. Two utility theoretic approaches for welfare analysis, that use
Hausman's (1981) method and the contingent valuation method, are outlined.
Edwards, Steven F. and Frank J. Gable (1991). "Estimating the Value of
Beach Recreation from Property Values: An Exploration with
Comparisons to Nourishment Costs." Ocean & Shoreline Management,
15:37-55.
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