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annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

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Jensen, Carsten Lynge (1998). "Investment Behavior and Tax Policy."<br />

Marine Resource Economics, 13(3):185-196.<br />

This paper concerns the behavioral modeling <strong>of</strong> the aggregated capital<br />

dynamics in the Danish fishing fleet. The emphasis is placed on testing the<br />

impact <strong>of</strong> the after-tax user cost <strong>of</strong> capital and aggregated pr<strong>of</strong>it on capital<br />

dynamics in the fishing fleet. It is argued that the investment behavior is<br />

driven by the incentives created by implemented tax and depreciation<br />

legislation. The policy implication <strong>of</strong> the study is that a tax on capital is<br />

seen as an effective tool in controlling incentives for overcapitalization in<br />

the fishing fleet.<br />

Jensen, Frank and Niels Vestergaard (1999). "Regulation <strong>of</strong> Renewable<br />

Resources in Federal Systems: The Case <strong>of</strong> Fishery in the EU."<br />

Working Paper No. 3/99, University <strong>of</strong> Southern Denmark, Denmark,<br />

July, 51 pp.<br />

The EU regulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>fisheries</strong> is decided in two levels. The level <strong>of</strong><br />

the total allowable catch (TAC) for the most important species is decided<br />

every year by the Council <strong>of</strong> Ministers. The TACs are allocated t the Member<br />

States as quotas. The Member states determine who is going to harvest the<br />

quota. There is, however, an information problem associated with this<br />

structure. It does not take into account how efficient fishermen in different<br />

countries are. In this paper we model the information problem as an adverse<br />

selection problem and analyze an EU tax coupled t effort as an alternative to<br />

the TAC system. We work with the hypothesis that EU suffers from a fiscal<br />

illusion and includes tax revenue in the objective function in order to<br />

finance other, also inefficient, operations. Even in the light <strong>of</strong> these<br />

imperfections there are at least two reasons for re3commeding an EU tax.<br />

First, it can be used to correct part <strong>of</strong> the market failure associated with<br />

fishery. Second, it can be used to secure correct revelation <strong>of</strong> types in the<br />

light <strong>of</strong> asymmetric information.<br />

Jensen, William and Hans Radtke (1987). "Recreational Fishing: A<br />

Conceptual Overview for Economic Impact Modeling." Draft report.<br />

This paper is concerned with the concept <strong>of</strong> impact assessment as it<br />

relates to recreational fishing activities. More narrowly, it focuses<br />

primarily on the ocean <strong>fisheries</strong>. It is hoped that a well defined impact<br />

assessment procedure will limit the misuses <strong>of</strong> economic information and reduce<br />

the number <strong>of</strong> confusing statements made. Contains an overview <strong>of</strong> the<br />

assessment <strong>of</strong> economic impacts.<br />

Jensen, William and Hans Radtke (1988). "Recreational Fishing Economic<br />

Assessment Model." (Version 1.1), Resource Valuations, Inc.,<br />

17618 S.W. Lake Haven Dr., Lake Oswego, Oregon.<br />

A menu driven computer program that allows the evaluation <strong>of</strong> the<br />

economic impact <strong>of</strong> recreational fishing activities.<br />

Jent<strong>of</strong>t, Svein (1989). "Fisheries Co-Management: Delegating Government<br />

Responsibility to Fishermen's Organizations." Marine Policy,<br />

13:137-154.<br />

This article addresses the role <strong>of</strong> cooperative organizations in<br />

<strong>fisheries</strong> management and the extent to which fishermen's organizations are<br />

capable <strong>of</strong> handling regulatory functions. What are the problems inherent in<br />

the cooperative management approach, and what may be the benefits compared to<br />

other regulatory systems? Which circumstances may be beneficial for the<br />

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