annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

considerations compounds the complications of scale. The challenge for
management will be to overcome the complication of scale by recognition of the
implications of a mixture of scales.
Stevens, Robert E. (1984). "Recommendations for Action: Panel 5
Development and the Management Process." Chapter 24 in Richard H.
Stroud (ed.) Marine Recreational Fisheries, 9, Proceedings of the
Ninth Annual Marine Recreational Fisheries Symposium, Virginia
Beach, Virginia, April 24 and 25, National Coalition for Marine
Conservation, Inc., Savannah, Georgia.
A summary of the discussion on development and the management process.
Recommendations are made that will improve the chances for marine recreational
fisheries development.
Stollery, Kenneth (1986). "A Short-Run Model of Capital Stuffing in the
Pacific Halibut Fishery." Marine Resource Economics, 3(2):137-
153.
One of the predicted effects of regulation to curtail overfishing is
"capital stuffing" where boats are overcapitalized to take maximum advantage
of limited entry licensing or restrictions of the fishing season. The present
paper utilizes a short run competitive fishery model to assess the effects of
quotas and season restrictions in the Pacific halibut fishery. The results in
this case show labor productivity (a proxy for capital intensity) to be less
strongly related to the length of the fishing season than to the halibut
price, implying that the main effect of the quota may be an indirect one,
through restricting supply and raising the price.
Stollery, Kenneth (1986). "Monopsony Processing in an Open-Access
Fishery." Marine Resource Economics, 3(4):331-351.
In a recent paper, Clark and Munro (1980) showed that monopsony
processing more than offsets the effects of open access in the harvesting
sector of a commercial fishery, and leads to over conservation of the
resource. We show here that this conclusion depends critically on the cost of
capacity and consequent ease of entry and exit from the harvesting sector. In
particular, for low entry and exit speeds the monopsonist has a high degree of
monopoly power and by depressing the price over conserves the natural resource
relative to the social optimum, while as the adjustment speed approaches
infinity a monopsonist employing a discount rate equal to the social rate of
discount will be induced to behave optimally from the viewpoint of society.
By means of a simulation employing parameters from the Pacific halibut
fishery, we also show that a monopsonist subject to relatively sluggish entry
or exit may reap profits considerably less than the resource rents accruing if
the resource were optimally managed.
Stollery, Kenneth (1988). "Cooperatives as an Alternative to Regulation
in Commercial Fisheries." Marine Resource Economics, 4:289-304.
the problem of fisheries regulation is essentially one of assigning
property rights to a scarce resource. This paper investigates the effects of
the establishment of a fishery cooperative as an alternative to limited entry
licensing of a fishery, in effect transferring the property rights to the
managers of the cooperative. The consequences of this for resource
conservation are found to depend on the cooperative management policy. While
a cooperative that is passive with respect to entry will behave in a manner
identical to that of a competitive fishery, a cooperative that limits entry to
maximize the existing members' share tends to over conserve the resource
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