annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

stocks, optimum fishing capacity is normally a decision variable separate from
fishing effort. It is shown how the optimum fishing capacity depends on the
price of fish, the cost of capacity, and the harvest rule linking the
permitted catch to the size of the fish stock. Operating costs may also
influence the optimum capacity through the effect of stock thinning on the
cost per unit of fish caught and the level at which further depletion becomes
unprofitable.
Hannesson, Rognvaldur (1994). "Optimum Fishing Capacity and
International Transfer of Excess Allowable Catches." Land
Economics, 70(3):330-344.
This paper considers optimum fleet capacity for fish stocks that vary
randomly and are managed by separate states. Assigning a particular fleet to
a particular stock will be less profitable than allowing fleets to move
between stocks. Transfer of excess catch quotas between states improves
profitability, but produces a global optimum only if payments are attached to
the transfer. A free transfer of excess quotas results in overcapacity and
dissipation of rents. A Nash bargaining solution with respect to transfer
prices, but without side payments, gives solutions very close to the global
optimum.
Hannesson, Rognvaldur (1997). "Fishing as a Supergame." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 32:309-322.
This paper considers how cooperative solutions to games of sharing fish
resources can be supported by threat strategies. With highly mobile fish
stocks, the number of agents compatible with a cooperative self-enforcing
solution is not very high for reasonable values of the discount rate, but
sensitive to changes in the discount rate and costs and to cost heterogeneity.
With migrating stocks, where growth and reproduction depend on how much all
agents leave behind after harvesting, the likelihood of a cooperative, selfenforcing
equilibrium is increased. With a dominant player and a competitive
fringe the rents and optimum stock level of the dominant player fall quickly
as the share of the competitive fringe increases.
Hannesson, Rognvaldur (1998). Distribution of Benefits from International
Trade in Fishery Products? Discussion paper prepared for the FAO E-
Mail Conference on Fisheries Trade and Food Security, The Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway, 7 pp.
The subject of international trade is controversial and at times
emotional. Yet the theory of international trade, its generation of economic
benefits and its impact on their distribution is well developed and
uncontroversial. The generation and the distribution of gains from fish trade
can be in unexpected directions, as they depend critically on how well
countries manage their fish resources. Countries that do so badly or not at
all are more likely than not to lose from trading in fish; opening up trade is
like opening up a waste disposal bin into which productive resources will be
thrown to little or no good purpose. If on the other hand such countries were
to import fish as a result of trade they might in fact gain; lower fish prices
would lower the temptation to waste resources. The need for fish exporting
countries to manage their fisheries prudently can hardly be overstated.
Hannesson, Rognvaldur (1998). "Marine Reserves: What Would They
Accomplish?" Marine Resource Economics, 13(3):159-170.
A marine reserve is defined as a subset of the area over which a fish
stock is dispersed and closed to fishing. This paper investigates what will
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