annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

prices and their impact on fishing effort levels. Capital stuffing in a
fishery with transferable licenses can be determined.
Ward, John M. and Walter R. Keithly, Jr. (1998). Practical Implications of
Property Rights Based Management Using Empirical Models of a Common
Property Fishery: The Case of the Gulf of Mexico Shrimp Fishery.
Fisheries Management and Development presentation, Ninth IIFET
Conference, Norway.
Individual transferable quota (ITQ) prices are theoretically assumed to
affect prices and harvesting costs symmetrically. In this analysis, the
incidence of two different ITQ programs on the U.S. Gulf of Mexico shrimp
fishery are investigated. First, the impact of the ITQ prices are assumed to
affect only the ex-vessel price of shrimp. Second, the impact of ITQ prices
is assumed to affect only the harvesting cost per pound. This empirically
based simulation model demonstrates that if the annual ITQ prices affect the
harvesting costs, net benefits to the vessel owners are reduced and crew share
increases substantially; suggesting that owners and crews would negotiate to
achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth generated by the adoption of
ITQ programs. If the incidence of the ITQ regulations impact is on price, on
the other hand, then crew receives only a small increase in income and vessel
owner captures most of the increase in net benefits. In both cases, fleet
size declines causing a reduction in capacity.
Ward, John M. and Walter R. Keithly, Jr. (1999). Determining the Impacts of
Adopting Property Rights as a Fisheries Management Tool in Regulated
Open Access Fisheries. FAO Fish Rights 99 Conference, 14-17 November,
Fremantle, Australia.
In "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries
Management," Parzival Copes(1986)presents many sound arguments against the use
of individual quotas as a fishery management instrument citing the results of
actual applications. While individual quotas are not useful in the fisheries
"rationalization" process without transferability, transferability has
unsightly equity and income reallocation effects. The question that remains
unanswered is whether ITQ's are preferable to the common property or open
access fishery scenario. This question can be addressed by analyzing the
effect of adopting ITQ s in a computer simulation of a dynamic bioeconomic
model of the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. The computer simulation model is
based on empirical research conducted on the shrimp fishery, which developed
models of market supply and demand, fleet dynamics, and operating costs. This
dynamic simulation model will also address the question of whether fisheries
with highly variable recruitment are appropriate subjects for ITQ management.
Although a simulation model, the advantages of this approach are that the
actual behavior of a group of individual fishermen is the basis for the model,
various scenarios can be compared based on the same set of initial
assumptions, transition paths can be compared to long-run equilibrium
conditions, and an index based on the present value of net benefits can be
generated for open access, common property, and rights-based fishery resource
management.
Ward, John M. and Seth Macinko (1993). "Using Theory: Rethinking
Fisheries Bycatch Problems." Presented at the International
Conference on Fisheries Economics, Os, Norway, May 26-28.
A dynamic bioeconomic model that incorporates a commercial and
recreational fishery for a species of fish that is discarded in another
directed commercial fishery is developed and used to determine the economic
implications of a bycatch reduction device in a common property fishery.
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