annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

U.S. Atlantic surf clam and quahog fisheries are the first fisheries
managed under a limited entry program and an individual transferable quota
(ITQ) system under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
Relative to the limited entry program, the ITQ system shrank the offshore surf
clam fleet by about 40% in 1991. Savings in fishing capital and labor under
the ITQ system have occurred at no expense to the fleet's expansion of ocean
quahog harvesting. The ITQ system has created some economic and social
dislocation. Vessel capacity utilization increased by roughly 90%, and vessel
productivity increased by 46% to a record level in 1991 as the fleet reduced
its excess capital and capacity. Under the ITQ system, in 1992, the off-shore
surf clam and quahog resources were worth $84 million and generated resource
rents to the original ITQ owners of $14 million. Seasonal supply patterns
showed market distortion under the limited entry system. The surf clam exvessel
price in constant dollars has moved downward and the 1991 price under
the ITQ system was the lowest since 1980. The clam ex-vessel markets have
become highly concentrated with a small number of buyers. Under the ITQ
system, the largest buyers continued to gain market shares in the surf clamquahog
market in 1991. Other behaviors of these highly concentrated markets
include; vertical integration, unbalanced entry-exit conditions and price
stability. From the inception of the ITQ system through March 1992, the
number of ITQ owners declined by a third and the ITQ ownership concentration
increased slightly.
Wang, Stanley D. and Vuong H. Tang (1995). "The Surf Clam ITQ
Management: An Evaluation." Marine Resource Economics, 10(1):93-
98.
U.S. Atlantic surf clam and quahog fisheries are the first fisheries
managed under a limited entry program and an individual transferable quota
(ITQ) system under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
Relative to the limited entry program, the ITQ system shrank the offshore surf
clam fleet by about 40% in 1991. Savings in fishing capital and labor under
the ITQ system have occurred at no expense to the fleet's expansion of ocean
quahog harvesting. The ITQ system has created some economic and social
dislocation. Vessel capacity utilization increased by roughly 90%, and vessel
productivity increased by 46% to a record level in 1991 as the fleet reduced
its excess capital and capacity. Under the ITQ system, in 1992, the off-shore
surf clam and quahog resources were worth $84 million and generated resource
rents to the original ITQ owners of $14 million. Seasonal supply patterns
showed market distortion under the limited entry system. The surf clam exvessel
price in constant dollars has moved downward and the 1991 price under
the ITQ system was the lowest since 1980. The clam ex-vessel markets have
become highly concentrated with a small number of buyers. Under the ITQ
system, the largest buyers continued to gain market shares in the surf clamquahog
market in 1991. Other behaviors of these highly concentrated markets
include; vertical integration, unbalanced entry-exit conditions and price
stability. From the inception of the ITQ system through March 1992, the
number of ITQ owners declined by a third and the ITQ ownership concentration
increased slightly.
Ward, Frank A. (1983). "On the Necessity of Simultaneous Recreation
Demand Equation Estimation: Comment." Land Economics, 59(4):455-
458.
Hof and King (1982) develop an improved and simplified method for
estimating the recreational benefits of a single new site given the existence
of a system of substitute and complement sites. The authors essentially
conclude that when only one new site is involved, its benefits can be
evaluated without bias by merely estimating the demand function for that
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