annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

258.
If the short run marginal costs of setting and retrieving a net one more
time, fishing an extra day, or setting an extra pot or trap are constant, then
the prediction by Anderson (1976) that entry limitations preserve a portion of
the fishery's value could be invalid. A vessel's optimum capital intensity
depends on the length of the fishing season. The shorter the fishing season,
the less time each fisherman has to utilize his capital to harvest fish, and
the less total fishing effort is applied to the fishery. Since higher levels
of catching power are now utilized over a shorter fishing season, they lose
some of their cost advantages, and less capital intensive vessels become more
cost effective. Stricter time constraints penalize more capital intensive
vessels relatively heavily and create wealth transfers among classes of
fishermen.
The logical extension of this line of reasoning would be that less
capital intensive vessels tend to dominate fisheries that have severely
limited fishing seasons. However, in practice it would appear that more
capital intensive vessels appear in fisheries that are the most time
restricted, e.g. the herring fisheries in the Pacific northwest. Perhaps this
result occurs because of the author's use of time in a static analysis or
because of the failure to consider the common property externality explicitly
in his analysis.
Karpoff, Jonathan M. (1987). "Suboptimal Controls in Common Resource
Management: The Case of the Fishery." Journal of Political
Economy, 95(11):179-194.
The discrepancy between elaborate proposals to solve the common pool
fishery problem and actual fishery regulations is examined. The self-interest
hypothesis of regulation and fisherman heterogeneity can explain tow
historically popular types of fishery regulations, season closures and capital
constraints. These have differential impacts on fishermen and typically
redistribute the fishery's harvest from more efficient toward less efficient
producers. To the extent that fishermen indigenous to a regulatory body's
jurisdiction also tend to be relatively inefficient, it is predicted that
these regulations will withstand the theory and data that demonstrate their
suboptimality.
Karpoff, J.M. (1989). "Characteristics of Limited Entry Fisheries and
the Option Component of Entry Licenses." Land Economics, 65(4),
pp. 386-393.
The paper examines conditions under which fishermen are likely to
support entry restrictions. Entry restrictions generate positive (quasi-)
rents precisely because they exclude or have the potential to exclude some
fishermen. The probability of exclusion is positive for most fishermen, so
advocacy of entry restrictions is not riskless. For many fishermen the risk
of exclusion outweighs the expected gain from restricted competition. When
fishermen do advocate entry restrictions, they do so when the expected net
gain is positive.
Kates, Robert W. (1996). Ending Hunger: Current Status and Future
Prospects. Consequences, 2(2):2-11.
This assessment describes what is now known about global hunger, past
and present trends, and the possibility of ending hunger in a world with at
least twice the current population. It begins by defining what hunger means,
and reviewing current estimates and trends in the number and location of
hungry people in the world today.
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