annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

costs and returns survey data are available. The methodology is transferable
to other fisheries that have previous cost surveys.
Furlong, William J. (1991). "The Deterrent Effect of Regulatory
Enforcement in the Fishery." Land Economics, 67(1):116-129.
The common property problem derives from the incompatibility of
individual incentives with collective interests. In the fishery this
incompatibility results in a greater than optimum stock depletion.
Authorities have responded to overfishing with a cornucopia of regulations.
In practice, most of the widely employed regulations are not self-enforcing;
enforcement costs must therefore be incurred. The purpose of the present
study is to investigate the deterrent effect of regulatory enforcement in the
fishery. In particular, estimates of the so called "supply of offenses: are
obtained with observations of individual behavior drawn from a random survey
of fishermen. The study focuses upon the response of violation rates to
changes in different enforcement sanctions. Insight into the relative
effectiveness of alternative enforcement tools may lead to a more efficient
regulatory policy.
Galbraith, R.D. and P.A.M. Steward (1995). Bio-Economic Modelling Workshop.
In, Bio-Economic Modelling in the EU, Concerted Action Coordination of
Research in Fishery Economics, Working Document Nr: 7,(AIR CT94 1489),
Workshop, Edinburgh, October: 148-158.
In the light of current concerns with over-exploitation of traditional
stocks, past and present definitions of fishing effort are discussed and the
concepts of fishing time and fishing power in relation to vessel parameters
and gear performance examined. Proposals are set out on how gear size might
be monitored and current research projects are briefly discussed.
Gallastegui, Carmen (1983). "An Economic Analysis of Sardine Fishing in
the Gulf of Valencia (Spain)." Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 10:138-150.
The optimal management of a particular fishery is illustrated. Using
data describing previous fishery exploitation, relevant biological and
economic relationships are estimated, then the optimum levels of catches,
effort, and stock are calculated. The prices that if implemented, would
ensure the current efficient exploitation of the fishery are also calculated.
Finally, the welfare gains that can be achieved by a movement from the free
market equilibrium to the socially optimum solution are demonstrated.
Gallaway, B.J. and W.J. Gazey (1996). A Review of the Goodyear (1995) Red
Snapper Stock Assessment. Report prepared for presentation to Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council, Lincoln Center, Suite 331, 5401 W.
Kennedy Blvd., Tampa, FL, August, 45 pp.
A review of Goodyear s (1995) red snapper stock assessment that suggests
that environmental factors were not adequately addressed; specifically the
hypoxic zone off of Louisiana and the impact of oil platforms on aggregation
of red snappers. Also, mortality rates for age 0 and age 1 fish are set too
low in Goodyear s analysis. His conclusions that variation of the natural
mortality rates would not change the results based on a sensitivity analysis
using conditional survival rates from fishing are misleading. A broader
assessment is suggested that includes fishery, oceanographic, and habitat
submodels. Goodyear (1996) refutes this review of the assessment.
Gallaway, B.J., J.D. Bryan, L.R. Martin, and J.G. Cole (1995).
Sea Turtle
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