annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

Potential Effects of Individual Transferable Quotas in the Fixed
Gear Sablefish Fishery." Administrative Report LJ-92-08, NMFS,
Southwest Fisheries Science Center, P.O. Box 271, La Jolla, CA
92038.
This paper ex ante analyzes a potential program of individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) in a fishery to assess the prospective gains in
economic rent from explicitly valuing the user cost of the resource and to
evaluate the arbitrage efficiency from quota exchange. Incentives for
disinvestment and industry exit after quota exchange, implications for
structure of the industry and ITQ market, and policy implications are
discussed. The simulation model of the ITQ market is based on pseudo data
from linear programming models for each vessel in the pot and longline
sablefish fleet off the Pacific coast of the United States.
Squires, Dale, Mohammad Alauddin, and James Kirkley (1994). "Individual
Transferable Quota Markets and Investment Decisions in the Fixed
Gear Sablefish Fishery." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 27:185-204.
This paper presents an ex ante analysis of an individual transferable
quota (ITQ) program imposed on one species in a multispecies fishery.
Utilizing mathematical programming, pseudo data, and Tobit regression, market
demand for quota and prospective gains in economic rent and efficiency gains
from quota trade are assessed for the pot and longline sablefish fleet off the
Pacific coast of the United States. Incentives for disinvestment and industry
exit after quota exchange, implications for structure of the industry and ITQ
market, and policy implications are examined.
Squires, Dale, James Kirkley, and Clement A. Tisdell (1994).
"Individual Transferable Quotas as a Fisheries Management Tool."
Draft report presented at the Limited Access Workshop, Seattle,
Washington, November 1-3. National Marine Fisheries Service,
Southwest Fisheries Science Center, P.O. Box 271, La Jolla,
California, January.
Fisheries management faces a new era. Markets, in the form of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and growing global integration of fish
markets, will increasingly provide the organizing and regulatory principle for
many fisheries. Whether ITQs and global markets are a panacea or Pandora's
box for organizing and managing fisheries is, as yet, unclear, and requires
additional experience to fully evaluate.
This paper reviews the workings and expected benefits of ITQs, the
origin and concept of ITQs, the problems they were designed to address, worldwide
experience and literature on ITQs, and the problems and prospects for ITQ
management. Particular attention will be given to the growing importance of
markets as the primary organizing principle for many fisheries, including the
roles of ITQs and increased global integration of fisheries markets.
Squires, Dale, James Kirkley, and Clement A. Tisdell (1995).
"Individual Transferable Quotas as a Fisheries Management Tool."
Reviews in Fisheries Science, 3(2):141-169.
Fisheries management faces a new era. Markets, in the form of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and growing global integration of fish
markets, will increasingly provide the organizing and regulatory principle for
many fisheries. Whether ITQs and global markets are a panacea or Pandora's
box for organizing and managing fisheries is, as yet, unclear, and requires
additional experience to fully evaluate.
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