annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

net was most effective in reducing retention of smallest-sized thread herring,
and the modified Parrish TED retained less of the smallest-sized spot. The
objective of 50% bycatch reduction with a shrimp loss of less than 5% was not
consistently reached; however, BRDs show promise for bycatch reduction in
South Atlantic coastal waters.
Runge, Carlisle Ford (1981). "Common Property Externalities: Isolation,
Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing
Context." American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63(4):595-
606.
Institutional alternatives to common property externalities are wider
than argued by private exclusive property rights advocates. The "tragedy of
the commons" is not a prisoners' dilemma, characterized by the strict
dominance of individual strategies. The nonseparable common property
externality is an "assurance problem." The assurance problem provides
striking perspectives in analytical and policy terms. It redefines the
problem of the commons as one of decision making under uncertainty.
Institutional rules innovated by the group to reduce uncertainty and
coordinate expectations can solve the problem of overexploitation. Rules come
in many forms, and private property is only one.
Runge, Carlisle Ford (1984). "Institutions and the Free Rider: The
Assurance Problem in Collective Action." The Journal of Politics,
46:154-181.
Political and economic theory make extensive use of the one period
Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) to model public goods problems and collective action
generally. While the PD provides important insights into the breakdowns of
social institutions, it gives no explanation of how or why institutions are
developed in the first place. This paper presents a related approach: the
Assurance Problem (AP). The AP suggests that interdependent choice creates
incentives to establish and maintain institutions that coordinate expectations
based on rules of fairmindedness. With such coordinated expectations,
voluntary contributions to public goods may be utility maximizing strategies.
Runge, Carlisle Ford (1984). "Strategic Interdependence in Models of
Property Rights." American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
66(5):807-813.
This essay explores the implications of strategic interdependence for
the theory of property rights and the "new institutional economics"
(Schotter). It attempts to clarify some of the linkages from institutional
economics to micro- and macroeconomic theory by considering how property
institutions result from strategic interdependence, confer payoffs to
individual agents, and reflect collective choices based on individual
preferences.
Russell, Clifford (1979). "Applications of Public Choice Theory: An
Introduction." Introduction from Clifford Russell (ed.)
Collective Decision Making. Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for
the Future.
Public choice is concerned with the mechanisms by which human societies
make decisions about their collective lives.
Sadeh, Arye, Hovav Talpaz, David A. Bessler, and Wade L. Griffin (1989).
"Optimization of Management Plans with Short and Long Run
Problems: The Case of Shrimp Production." European Journal of
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