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annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

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The marine recreational boat fishery in the heavily populated New York<br />

City metropolitan area has not been well described. This paper describes the<br />

1971 catch composition and the distribution <strong>of</strong> estimated effort over spatial<br />

and seasonal scales and between major vessel types (party, charter, and<br />

private boats) engaged in the fishery. Anglers spent an estimated 2.3 million<br />

hours fishing in the New York Bight apex in 1971, over half <strong>of</strong> this by party<br />

boat anglers, and caught almost 8 million game fish. Overall effort was about<br />

equal for pelagic and demersal species and was generally concentrated<br />

nearshore. There appeared to be a substantial change in the fishery since the<br />

late 1940's and early 1950's, possibly reflecting socioeconomic trends and<br />

population dynamics <strong>of</strong> the fish species.<br />

Buchanan, James M. (1980). "Rent Seeking and Pr<strong>of</strong>it Seeking." Chapter<br />

1 in Toward a Theory <strong>of</strong> the Rent Seeking Society, College Station,<br />

Texas A&M University.<br />

As institutions have moved away from ordered markets toward the near<br />

chaos <strong>of</strong> direct political allocation, rent seeking has emerged as a<br />

significant social phenomenon.<br />

Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1975). "Polluters' Pr<strong>of</strong>its and<br />

Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes." American<br />

Economic Review, 65(1):139-147.<br />

Economists <strong>of</strong> divergent political persuasions agree on the superior<br />

efficacy <strong>of</strong> penalty taxes as instruments for controlling significant external<br />

diseconomies that involve the interaction <strong>of</strong> many parties. However, political<br />

leaders and bureaucratic administrators, charges with doing something about<br />

these problems, appear to favor direct controls. Our purpose in this paper is<br />

to present a positive theory <strong>of</strong> externality control that explains the observed<br />

frequency <strong>of</strong> direct regulation as opposed to penalty taxes or charges. In the<br />

public choice theory <strong>of</strong> policy, the interests <strong>of</strong> those who are subjected to<br />

the control instruments must be taken into account as well as the interests <strong>of</strong><br />

those affected by the external diseconomies. As we develop this theory <strong>of</strong><br />

policy we shall also emphasize an elementary efficiency basis for preferring<br />

taxes and charges which heret<strong>of</strong>ore has been neglected by economists.<br />

Buck, Eugene H. (1995). Overcapitalization in the U.S. Commercial Fishing<br />

Industry. Senior Analyst in Natural Resources Policy, Environment and<br />

Natural Resources Policy Division, Congressional Research Service, The<br />

Library <strong>of</strong> Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540, February 22, 17 pp.<br />

A review <strong>of</strong> the concepts <strong>of</strong> overcapitalization in world and U.S.<br />

domestic <strong>fisheries</strong>, its causes, and possible solutions written for a<br />

nontechnical audience. With too many fishermen vying for too few fish, the<br />

U.S. commercial fishing industry is becoming as overcapitalized as the<br />

resource is over fished. A management regime that addresses open access<br />

concerns appears warranted, as does an overall reduction in fishing capacity.<br />

Nevertheless, significant questions remain. In particular, how and in what<br />

form should access be addressed? In what sector(s) and by what means ought<br />

reductions in capital invested in the commercial fishing industry occur? And,<br />

what is the role <strong>of</strong> the Federal government in such proceedings? These<br />

questions and several others await careful evaluation by scientists,<br />

conservationists, industry experts, and lawmakers alike, while the fates <strong>of</strong><br />

fishermen and the fish they depend upon hang in the balance.<br />

Buck, Eugene H. (1995). Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries<br />

Management. Senior Analyst in Natural Resources Policy, Environment<br />

and Natural Resources Policy Division, Congressional Research Service,<br />

9 6

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