annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

This paper evaluates the actual operation of an ITQ program in New
Zealand, identify problems that have caused difficulties in the actual
operation of the program, to assess their potential seriousness, and where
possible to suggest possible remedies. This program is one of the first in
the world and it is the only one that encompasses essentially all of a
nation's marine fisheries. The theoretical advantages of ITQs are easy to
see. However, it is difficult to design an actual program that will actually
achieve these benefits in a world of less than perfect information and costly
and sometimes cumbersome implementation and enforcement.
Anderson, Lee G. (1989). "Conceptual Constructs for Practical ITQ
Management Policies." In P.A. Neher et al. (eds.) (1989). Rights
Based Fishing, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 191-209.
This report builds a conceptual model in which any number of practical
management issues in an individual transferable quota program (ITQ) can be
discussed. The topics that are given specific attention, however, are the
nature of management rent, the workings of the market for ITQs, resource
rentals, and problems with bycatch.
Anderson, Lee G. (1991). "Note: A Note of Market Power in ITQ
Fisheries." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
21:291-296.
Individual transferable quotas, ITQs, in fisheries are analogous to
transferable pollution permits in environmental policy. However, they are
different in that the right to produce is for the final product, the fish,
whereas pollution permits are for a nonmarket joint product (i.e., sulfur
dioxide) of the good produced for sale. In both cases, the actual economic
efficiency effects of creating the property rights depend upon the workings of
the market for both the final product and the rights. There has been
considerable work on market failures for pollution permits, and this paper
extends the analysis to ITQs. It is shown that the difference between
pollution permits and ITQs can change the type and occurrence of failure in
the market for the final product, but it does not affect the potential for
failure in the market for permits.
Anderson, Lee G. (1991). "Efficient Policies to Maintain Total
Allowable Catches in ITQ Fisheries with At-Sea Processing." Land
Economics, 67(2):141-57.
This paper discusses the economic aspects of determining a conversion
factor program that will maintain the total allowable catch in an individual
transferable quota program. Since TACs are denominated in terms of total
biomass but fish are often landed after at sea processing, provision must be
made to convert the landed weight to a green weight. The conversion factor is
a serious problem in the New Zealand ITQ program.
Anderson, Lee G. (1992). "Consideration of the Potential Use of
Individual Transferable Quotas in U.S. Fisheries." Vol 1-5.
Final Report, NOAA Contract No. 40AANF101849.
Using four different U.S. fisheries as examples spanning a wide range of
situations from those which are conducive to ITQs to those which are
problematic for ITQs, this report explains the general principles of ITQs and
shows how they might be applied to specific fisheries.
Anderson, Lee G. (1992). "Consideration of the Potential Use of
Individual Transferable Quotas in U.S. Fisheries." Vol 1-5.
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