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annotated bibliography of fisheries economics literature - Office of ...

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This report describes the basic concepts <strong>of</strong> <strong>economics</strong> and the tools used<br />

to answer the question <strong>of</strong> how much wetlands should be preserved and what is<br />

the value <strong>of</strong> the land in its natural state, and the methods used to estimate<br />

demand curves for wetlands. These methods are then divided into those that<br />

adhere to economic theory and those that were developed outside <strong>of</strong> the<br />

paradigm <strong>of</strong> <strong>economics</strong>.<br />

Cropper, Maureen L. (1988). "A Note on the Extinction <strong>of</strong> Renewable<br />

Resources." journal <strong>of</strong> Environmental Economics and Management,<br />

15:64-70.<br />

This paper presents two sets <strong>of</strong> conditions under which a sole owner <strong>of</strong> a<br />

renewable resource stock who maximizes a nonlinear benefit function would find<br />

it more pr<strong>of</strong>itable to harvest the stock to extinction than follow a continuous<br />

harvesting strategy. When the minimum viable resource stock is positive,<br />

extinction is optimal as long as the initial resource stock is sufficiently<br />

small, regardless <strong>of</strong> the discount rate. When the minimum viable resource<br />

stock is zero and the discount rate exceeds the growth potential <strong>of</strong> the<br />

species extinction is optimal for sufficiently small initial stocks.<br />

Cropper, Maureen L. and Wallace E. Oates (1992). "Environmental<br />

Economics: A Survey." Journal <strong>of</strong> Economic Literature, 30(2):675-<br />

740.<br />

The evolution <strong>of</strong> environmental policy has inevitably brought economic<br />

issues to the fore. Our survey <strong>of</strong> environmental <strong>economics</strong> is structured with<br />

an eye toward its policy potential. For this purpose, we have tried to<br />

distinguish between environmental <strong>economics</strong> that deals with (1) the regulation<br />

<strong>of</strong> polluting activities and (2) the valuation <strong>of</strong> environmental amenities and<br />

natural resource <strong>economics</strong> that deals with the intertemporal allocation <strong>of</strong><br />

renewable and nonrenewable resources.<br />

Crothers, Grant T. (1986). "Individual Transferable Quotas: the New<br />

Zealand Experience." Draft Report, Ministry <strong>of</strong> Agriculture and<br />

Fisheries, Wellington, New Zealand.<br />

A historical overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>fisheries</strong> management in New Zealand with<br />

special emphasis on individual transferable quotas. The introduction <strong>of</strong> ITQ<br />

established long term economic principles which have created a new <strong>fisheries</strong><br />

management environment. Within certain conservation constraints, allocation<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>fisheries</strong> resources is now largely dictated by market forces. To<br />

appreciate New Zealand's market oriented management approach, it is necessary<br />

to view the commercial fishery in its physical and historical context.<br />

Crouch, Ben M. (1989). "Mexican Shrimp, Texas Shrimpers, and Maritime<br />

Conflict: The Creation <strong>of</strong> a White Collar Crime." Deviant<br />

Behavior, 10:211-232.<br />

Though not its specific intent, the 1981 amendment <strong>of</strong> the Lacey Act<br />

transformed a traditional practice among south Texas shrimpers-fishing in<br />

Mexican waters--into a violation <strong>of</strong> federal maritime law. Prior to the<br />

amendment this practice was overlooked by U.S. authorities and only<br />

sporadically controlled by Mexican authorities. Federal strategies for Lacey<br />

Act enforcement in the northern Gulf <strong>of</strong> Mexico and shrimper reactions to them<br />

led to an escalation <strong>of</strong> conflict between U.S. fishermen and authorities.<br />

Drawing on <strong>of</strong>ficial documents and extensive interviews with both shrimpers and<br />

federal agents, the analysis examines federal authority and shrimper<br />

interaction over time and applies Turk's theory <strong>of</strong> normative-legal conflict to<br />

explain the course <strong>of</strong> that interaction.<br />

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