dogu-turkistan-sempozyumu

FREEEAST TURKISTAN SYMPOSIUMChina known as the “Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region”, which most Uighurand pre-1940 maps of the area refer to as “Eastern Turkestan,” are upstandingcitizens of the People’s Republic of China, primarily agriculturalists and urbandwellersin the largest cities and oases across the region. They are still the largestpopulation group in the region, and as an official “minority nationality”, receivecertain special privileges along with several other minorities, many of them alsoMuslim (including Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, etc.), but are now being surpassedin population by a growing number of Han Chinese settlers from the interior ofChina. Yet, as the lengthy quote from the fictional novel above richly illustrates,there are many who believe many international organizations are supportingUighur independence movements, and even terroristic violence. There is a certainlogic to this line of thinking.Since the end of the 19 th century, Muslims in China have been struggling overthe answer to two key questions regarding their religious and national identity.These questions, once thought resolved, have re-emerged with critical relevancein the aftermath of 9/11 in the midst of the war on terrorism -a war that hasaffected China’s Muslims more directly than any other of its many peoples.These questions have been best articulated by theorists struggling with thenature and notion of nationalism, and the consequences of its combination withreligious ideologies, which produces a very modern and violent strain of religiousnationalism. The first question was best articulated by Benedict Anderson whenhe asked in his seminal work, Imagined Communities, why it is that one wouldbe willing to “die for the nation” (Anderson 1983/1991:7). The second question iseven more relevant to events depicted in the fictionalized account above (but alltoo real in the modern world where terrorist acts take place on an all too frequentscale). This question was perhaps best articulated by Mark Juergensmeyer in histreatise, Terror in the Mind of God. Seeking to understand the logic of religiousviolence, he asks how can seemingly good people commit terrorist acts againstothers “in the name of religion”? ( Juergensmeyer 2001: 24-30). Jessica Sternrephrased this question in her book, Terror in the Name of God: Why ReligiousMilitants Kill (2003). The questions are close, but distinct. Anderson asked whatmakes it possible for so many people “not so much to kill, as willingly die forsuch limited imaginings” (1991: 7). For Juergensmeyer and Stern, its more the452