GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

IO6 ETHICS AND POLITICS! THE GREEKS
possibly after severe moral struggle, so to do on each particular
occasion. From this point of view it might almost
be said that it is Aristotle's object to eliminate altogether
that factor of moral conflict upon which the Christian
doctrine of temptation lays stress, the conflict which
arises when a man wants to do X, but feels that he ought
to do Y. Some ethical philosophers, for example Kant, 1 have
written as if duty were always opposed to desire, the
implication being that we may recognize our duty by
reason of the fact that it is disagreeable. But Aristotle's
man of good character will not only do his duty naturally
and habitually by virtue of the training which he has
acquired; he will actually take pleasure in so doing. And
if we ask why it is that he finds right action pleasing, the
answer will again be, because that is the way in which he
has been trained and educated. If, however, his training
has been imperfect, then, although he may perceive what
is right and good, he will nevertheless be unable to do
the right and pursue the good. Thus Aristotle seeks to
correct and amplify Socratcs's theory that virtue is
knowledge, by pointing out that unless our appetites and
emotions have been trained in such a way
as to cause us
to desire what is right, the mere fact that we know what
is right will not be enough to make us do it.
Virtues of the Intellect Developed only by
the Few.
3. Who is responsible for this all-important training?
The answer is one with which we are already familiar,
the educator and the legislator. The educator and
the legislator are, as we have seen, aware in a
general way of the nature of the Good for man.
They are also possessed of trained judgments by
means of which they are enabled to recognize that this
particular law and this particular rule of conduct are
embodiments or expressions of the Good. Like Plato's
Guardians, they both know the general and recognize
that the particular is an example of the general. The
See Chapter VI, pp. atSr tig.