GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE UTILITARIANISM 319
one and try to give a fuller answer as part of the
general- theory of value which is contained in Chapter
XII. 1 Let us, however, say provisionally that a suitable
environment must be at once a. humane environment, so
that a person who from birth has been subject to its
influence will wish to prevent human suffering, and a
sensitive environment, so that he will be quick to detect
occasions for human suffering. In a word, the environment
must be civilized.
Thus, when we judge an action to be right on the
" intended consequences" theory, 'we are judging that it
is such as a man will perform who desires to produce
certain results which he believes to be good results, who
is qualified by native endowment, by training and by
education to make a reasonably accurate estimate of what
the results of the action are likely to be, and, we must
add, who takes the trouble to obtain all the data, or as
many of them as are available, which are relevant to the
making of such an estimate.
The Element of Intelligence in Moral Worth. Two
conclusions suggest themselves* The first is one at which
we have already glanced. The proper object of ethical
judgment is neither action, motive, nor consequences,
but is a whole situation of which each of these forms a
constituent part but which nevertheless extends beyond
them, and which should ideally include a reference to
such factors as natural endowment, training, education,
environment, and willingness to take trouble to collect the
data necessary for judgment, and to scrutinise it_ _
view to ensuring that the judgment will be^^^njfktg
as possible. /&&&&
Secondly, the more intelligent a man iffittfj&r* fully
his natural faculties have 'been dc
numerous the data which he has colic
to his decision on a course of action, |
will the consequences which he intends
1 See Chapter XII, pp. 447