GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

THE PR'OBLEM OF FREE WILL 245
given) all the factors at which we have already glanced,
inherited constitution) psychological disposition, training,
environment, and the rest) may be introduced in order to
explain why it is that our reasons work in the way and
reach the conclusions they do, and why, because they do
work in this way and reach these conclusions) certain
motives cannot help but appear to them the weightiest
for the determination of action. Thus although the case
for Self-determinism can be argued most persuasively on
the assumption that non-rational factors govern choice,
it need not necessarily reject the view that it is our reason
which chooses and determines our actions.
II. THE CASE FOR FREE WILL
A* Criticism of Dctenninist Arguments
I mentioned at the outset that what might be called the
short-term arguments in the controversy between fixe
will and determinism are all on the side of determinism,
nor are those which I have examined refutable by logic.
In so far as a case can be made for free will, it will be
found to depend very largely upon certain metaphysical
considerations. It will, that is to say, presuppose the
acceptance of certain views of the nature of the universe
as a whole and of the status and function of human con-
sciousness within the universe. The adequate discussion
of these views falls outside the scope of this book.
(i) Criticism of the Cosmic Arguments for Determinism.
It is, however, relevant to point out that the cosmic
arguments for determinism presuppose) no less than the
arguments for free-will, a particular metaphysical view.
This is the view that nature works like a vast machine)
and that human nature is merely one particular cog in
the machine, This view is one which most philosophers
reject. The universe, as many have thought) may be ideal;
it may, that is to say, be in its essential nature akin to