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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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ETHICAL <strong>THE</strong>ORY SURVEYED 387<br />

rel<strong>at</strong>ive to circumstances prevailing in myielf. In other<br />

words, wh<strong>at</strong> I estim<strong>at</strong>e the temper<strong>at</strong>ure of the room to<br />

be will be determined by personal consider<strong>at</strong>ions. But this<br />

fact does not show th<strong>at</strong> the room does not possess a<br />

temper<strong>at</strong>ure in its own right; nor does it show th<strong>at</strong>, when -<br />

I make my estim<strong>at</strong>e of it, my estim<strong>at</strong>e refers to nothing<br />

<strong>at</strong> all. In other words, nobody would deduce from the<br />

fact th<strong>at</strong> I guessed the temper<strong>at</strong>ure of the room to be<br />

75 Fahrenheit, while somebody else 70 Fahrenheit,<br />

guessed it to be<br />

th<strong>at</strong> we were both of us making st<strong>at</strong>ements<br />

about events th<strong>at</strong> were taking place in ourselves<br />

and were not in fact saying something about the room<br />

and its temper<strong>at</strong>ure. Indeed, if the room had no temper<strong>at</strong>ure<br />

in its own right, it would be difficult to understand<br />

how we were ever led to make judgments about it.<br />

Similarly, the fact th<strong>at</strong> my judgments of right and good<br />

are different from those of other people differently circum-<br />

stanced, and the further fact th<strong>at</strong> my judgments are<br />

obviously determined by conditions of time and place<br />

and country and class and culture, all of which are personal<br />

conditions, do not justify the conclusion th<strong>at</strong>, when I<br />

say "X is right" or "X is good", I am in fact making<br />

a st<strong>at</strong>ement about myself, and am not saying something,<br />

whether true or false, about X and its ethical characteristics.<br />

Indeed, if there were no such things as ethical characteristics,<br />

it would be impossible to explain how we ever<br />

came to make judgments which postul<strong>at</strong>ed them and<br />

ascribed them to actions and persons.<br />

(c) THAT IT is NOT POSSIBLE ON A SUBJECTIVIST<br />

<strong>THE</strong>ORY ADEQUATELY <strong>TO</strong> ACCOUNT FOR <strong>THE</strong><br />

EXISTENCE OF MORAL NOTIONS. This leads to a<br />

further point If Subjectivism is correct, "X is good"'<br />

means "X produces a feeling of approval in me", or<br />

"X conduces to my advantage". It means, in fact, "X<br />

is pleasant", or "X is expedient", or "X is useful".<br />

But if "X is good", or "X is right" means the same<br />

as "X is pleasant", or "X is expedient", or "X is useful",

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