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ETHICAL THBORY SURVEYED 413
ought to desire the greatest pleasure on the whole, or the
greatest pleasure of the greatest number. These two forms
of Ethical Hedonism are sometimes known as Egoistic
Ethical Hedonism and Univcrsalistic Ethical Hedonism.
In the course of the foregoing discussions a number
of arguments which militate against the acceptance of
either view have been indicated. Here again, however,
it is doubtful whether any logical refutation is possible.
The nearest approach to one is afforded by the argument
already used in this chapter 1 to show that the term "good "
cannot be equated with any other concept whatever. If
this argument is correct, good cannot be equated with
pleasure.
Egoistic Ethical Hedonism has often been criticized
on the ground that it is a vulgar and unworthy doctrine,
and repugnant to the moral sense of mankind. If this
objection means anything at all, it means that most people
experience intuitions to the effect that some things other
than pleasure are good in themselves, and are not good
merely as a means to the increase of pleasure, the imputation
of vulgarity arising from the proposal to value merely
as a means to enjoyment that which is valuable in and
for its own sake. That most people do experience such
intuitions seems to be highly probable.
If it cannot be logically refuted, Ethical Hedonism
cannot be logically demonstrated.
Of the proposition that pleasure alone is good, or is the
Good, there is not, nor in the nature of things can there be,
any proof. It rests, as I have tried to show, upon an indefensible
intuition. It is not, therefore, surprising that when philosophers
do endeavour to defend it, they should fall into
inconsistency, as J. S. Mill fell into inconsistency when he
sought to establish the fact that there were different qualities
of pleasure, a higher and a lower.* Now it may be plausibly
suggested that these attempted defences are prompted by
their authors' unconscious recognition that die view that
pleasure is the only good is at variance with the plain
1 See above, pp. 388, 389.
* See Chapter IX, p. 330.