GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

OBJECTIVE INTUITIONISM ail
a little strangely to modern ears. Nevertheless, his position
has considerable force. This is due to its undoubted success in
providing an understandable account of the significance of
the word "ought", and a reasonable explanation of the
feeling of moral obligation for which the word "ought"
stands. "I want to do this"; "I have a strong temptation
to do this"; "I shall grow rich, powerful or popular by
doing this"; "I shall be happy if I do this"; "I shall 'get
away with it' if I do this" none of these statements
needs to be explained to us before we .can understand
its significance. But when we proceed to add, "Nevertheless,
I ought to do that", the position is different. Some
explanation of the word "ought" is, it is obvious, required.
Nor is it readily forthcoming. Examine the world around
us, explore physical nature, analyse and describe human
society, and you will accumulate information about what
is; you will, in short, ascertain facts. But you will not discover
what should be; the information that you obtain
will not include "oughts". The most elaborate examination
of fact will not be found to yield a single "ought". Whence,
then, do "oughts" derive? Kant's explanation is that
they arise, or rather that the recognition of them arises
in a part of our being by virtue of which we participate
in a world other than the world of fact, in the everyday
sense of the word "fact". The notion of moral obligation
comes to us, in other words, from reality, and in and
through it alone do we make contact with reality. This
explanation covers very satisfactorily the moral experience
of simple and uninstructed persons. For this, as I pointed
out above, 1 often expresses itself in judgments which
possess a directness and authority lacking in those of more
which leads
sophisticated people. The moral experience
them to pass these judgments is, it is obvious, fresh and
vivid. Since we are unable to trace the source of these
judgments to reflection upon the principles of conduct,
or estimates of social consequence*, it seems reasonable
to regard the .experience which gives rise to them and the
1 Sec pp. 176, 177.