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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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2O6<br />

'<br />

ETHICS<br />

Uniqueness of the Concept of "Ought 11<br />

Now this<br />

consciousness of "ought" is a unique feet, a fact of a kind<br />

which it not anywhere to be found in the world of thing!<br />

as they appear. "Oblig<strong>at</strong>ion," Kant says, "expresses a<br />

sort of necessity . . .- which occurs nowhere else in n<strong>at</strong>ure.<br />

It is impossible th<strong>at</strong> anything. in n<strong>at</strong>ure ought to b* other<br />

than in feet it is. 1<br />

In truth, oblig<strong>at</strong>ion if one has before<br />

one's eyes only the succession in n<strong>at</strong>ure has simply and<br />

solely no meaning. We can as little ask wh<strong>at</strong> ought to<br />

happen in n<strong>at</strong>ure as wh<strong>at</strong> <strong>at</strong>tributes a circle ought to have."<br />

It is because it recognizes the validity of "ought 11<br />

, th<strong>at</strong><br />

Kant gives a unique position to wh<strong>at</strong> he calls the good<br />

will, which is the source of moral action. "There is," he<br />

maintains! "nothing in the world nay, even beyond<br />

xthe world, nothing conceivable, which can be regarded<br />

as good without qualific<strong>at</strong>ion, saving alone a good will."<br />

The moral will is thus, by virtue of the oblig<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong><br />

it recognizes, placed outside the causal sequence which<br />

oper<strong>at</strong>es universally in the world of things as they appear.<br />

Nor can its content, th<strong>at</strong> is to say, the course of action<br />

which it prescribes, be derived from reflection upon things<br />

as they appear. The very feet th<strong>at</strong> it takes no account of<br />

likes and dislikes, th<strong>at</strong> it is indifferent to circumstances,<br />

suggests th<strong>at</strong> it is not the reflection of likes and dislikes<br />

or the product of circumstances. Whence, then, is it<br />

derived? Kant answers, from the n<strong>at</strong>ure of man regarded<br />

as a moral being. Hence man as a moral being is not<br />

an inhabitant of the world of tilings as they appear, but<br />

is a member of the world of things as they are. For this<br />

reason, when he obeys the moral law, he is spoken of as<br />

a law th<strong>at</strong> comes from himself from himself,<br />

obeying<br />

th<strong>at</strong> is to say, considered as a real and r<strong>at</strong>ional being<br />

and not as a member of the world of causes and effects.<br />

This obedience to the moral law, which is also moral freedom,<br />

is something which cannot be explained. For explan<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

is the work of understanding, and wh<strong>at</strong>ever<br />

the understanding understands, assunuts, just because it<br />

is understood, the st<strong>at</strong>us of a member of the world of tilings

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