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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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450<br />

ETHICS<br />

space in the works of writers upon ethics. Ethical writers<br />

have tended to look askance <strong>at</strong> evil; they have even produced,<br />

tre<strong>at</strong>ises which have ignored it altogether. When<br />

they have tre<strong>at</strong>ed evil, they have generally sought to explain<br />

it away, representing it as something neg<strong>at</strong>ive, the absence<br />

or depriv<strong>at</strong>ion of the good th<strong>at</strong> there might be, or as<br />

something illusory, an appearance due to the limit<strong>at</strong>ions<br />

or defects of human vision.<br />

Any such tre<strong>at</strong>ment seems to the present writer to falsify<br />

the n<strong>at</strong>ure of our ethical experience. To me it seems clear<br />

th<strong>at</strong> evil is a fact as real, as definite and as recognizable<br />

as good. The subject raises metaphysical issues and can<br />

only here be tre<strong>at</strong>ed in the most cursory way. I propose,<br />

however, to offer a number of brief observ<strong>at</strong>ions in support<br />

of the view just expressed, th<strong>at</strong> evil is a real and independent<br />

factor in the universe. I shall also try to show why<br />

the <strong>at</strong>tempts to explain it away, or to analyse it in terms<br />

of something else which is not evil, must necessarily fail.<br />

If I am right in holding th<strong>at</strong> evil no less than good,<br />

disvalue no less than value, is a real and independent<br />

factor in the universe, and th<strong>at</strong> the idea of it like the idea<br />

of good is simple, indefinable and unanalysable, it will<br />

follow th<strong>at</strong> any view which seeks to define evil in terms<br />

of anything else, as being, for example, the depriv<strong>at</strong>ion of<br />

good, or as a necessary condition for the manifest<strong>at</strong>ion of<br />

good, or as pain, or as sin, must be rejected. To say th<strong>at</strong> evil is<br />

pain, or is a necessary condition for the manifest<strong>at</strong>ion of<br />

good will be, if I am right, to make an affirm<strong>at</strong>ion about<br />

the sort of things th<strong>at</strong> aje evil but not to define evil. I<br />

will try as briefly as I can to defend this view. First, I will<br />

discuss its bearing upon the thcistic hypothesis.<br />

The Reality of Evil and the Thcistic Hypothesis.<br />

Owing to the difficulty of reconciling the reality of evil<br />

with the existence of a cre<strong>at</strong>ive deity who is both beneficent<br />

and omnipotent, many writers try to show th<strong>at</strong> evil is in<br />

some sense unreal, or is an illusion.<br />

The main reason for this endeavour is, it is obvious,

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