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GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

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l68 ETHICS<br />

We are denying, in other words, th<strong>at</strong> we can give reasons<br />

for wh<strong>at</strong> "we just tec". Or, we may try to give reasons;<br />

health, we may say, is better than disease because health<br />

makes for happiness, and disease for pain and misery.<br />

But why prefer happiness to pain and misery? With this<br />

question we have reached the same point as before. We<br />

can either say th<strong>at</strong> "we just see" happiness to be preferableand<br />

most people would be prepared to make<br />

this judgment- or we may take the argument a step further<br />

and try to give reasons for preferring happiness. But if<br />

we do this, we shall, sooner or l<strong>at</strong>er, reach the same point<br />

<strong>at</strong> which we have already twice tried to stop, the point<br />

<strong>at</strong> which we cease to give reasons and fall back upon the<br />

assertion "we just see". Now it is <strong>at</strong> this point th<strong>at</strong> we are<br />

passing a judgment of absolute, ultim<strong>at</strong>e, and unique<br />

value; it is unique in the sense th<strong>at</strong> no reasons can be<br />

given in defence of it; it is ultim<strong>at</strong>e in the sense th<strong>at</strong> no<br />

end of value is affirmed beyond wh<strong>at</strong> it is judged to be<br />

valuable, and it is absolute in the sense th<strong>at</strong> it cannot be<br />

resolved into, or derived from any other judgment<br />

N<strong>at</strong>ure of Absolute Judgments. An analogy may here be<br />

of service. Let us suppose th<strong>at</strong> I make the judgment, this<br />

curtain is red. This judgment, too, is absolute, ultim<strong>at</strong>e<br />

and unique in the sense in which I have just claimed th<strong>at</strong><br />

moral judgments are absolute, ultim<strong>at</strong>e and unique; for<br />

if I am asked why I judge the curtain to be red, or wh<strong>at</strong><br />

reason I have for judging it to be red, I can again give no<br />

answer. I can only say th<strong>at</strong> I just see it to be so. No doubt<br />

it is true th<strong>at</strong> I have been taught to give the name of red<br />

to colours of the particular kind which I am now seeing<br />

or, more correctly, to colours which give me the particular<br />

visual sens<strong>at</strong>ions which I am now experiencing but for<br />

my implied judgment th<strong>at</strong> this kind of colour which I<br />

am now seeing or which gives me the visual sens<strong>at</strong>ions<br />

which I am now experiencing belongs to the class which<br />

I have been taught to call red, I can give no reasons <strong>at</strong><br />

all. And since the reasons which we are accustomed to

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