GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

394
ETHICS
count. Since, however, it is a man's duty to see that the
remits of his actions have some relation to what it might
have been reasonable to expect, reason also insists that
the good man must be, at least to some extent, a reasoning
man. Therefore although intuitions may, and indeed do, lie
at the bases of all bonafib ethical judgments, Objective-
Inflationism in its traditional form cannot be accepted.
C Criticism of Utilitarian Theories
(i) THAT UTILITARIANISM FAILS TO RECOO-
KISI THAT STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS MAY BE
VALUABLE IN THEMSELVES. Objections tO UtUitarian
theories have been indicated in Chapter IX 1 , They
are broadly three. First, Utilitarianism makes no provision
for die fact that some states of mind and the actions which
proceed from them are accounted valuable, independently
of their results, by the moral consciousness of mankind.
While admitting the intuitions of the popular moral
consciousness to tins effect, utilitarians arc inclined to explain
them as the inherited versions of utilitarian principles
whose justifications have been forgotten.* The attitude and
behaviour of the resolute torturcc 1 is on their view only
approved now because a similar attitude and a similar
behaviour once had, or were liable to have, socially
beneficial consequences; they also insist that intuitions are
not enough and that ethical issues must in the last resort
be decided by reason.
These contentions involve a confusion between two differ*
ent questions. The assertion that reason must be the arbiter
in ethical matters may be accepted, if it means that it is
to reason that, in the last resort, we must look to determine
what ethical principles should be adopted and what
ethical conclusions established. The raw material which
the deliverances of the moral consciousness provide lor
*8ee Chapter DC, pp. 340-347*
, 339, OhmptcrX, pp. 374, 380-382,
on p. 300 a
See Chapter DC, pp. 346, 347.
mnd the