GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 1938 - 1947.pdf - Rare Books at ...

384
ETHICI
(a) THAT THE ONUS OF PROOF zs ON THE SUB-
JBCTIVISTS. In the first place, the onus of proof lies
throughout on the subjcctivists. If I say, "This chessboard,
X, is square" my statement may mean either (i) X has
a certain property which causes sensation of squareness
in most men who look at it, or (ii) most men will have
the sensation of squareness when they look at X. What
I certainly intend to assert is
(i), although by means of
a subtle philosophical analysis it can be shown that all
that I am really asserting is
(ii). In face, however, of my
manifest intention to assert (i) and my strong belief that
I am in fact doing so, the onus of proof is clearly laid on
those who wish to maintain that what my statement
really means is (ii).
Similarly, the assertions "X is a right
action" or "X
is a good man " may mean either (i) X has a certain property
such that it will cause most people who consider it or him
to feel a sentiment of moral approval, or (ii) most men will
experience the emotion of moral approval when they
consider X. Now there is not the slightest doubt in my
mind that, when I say "X is a right action" or "X is a
good man", what I mean to assert is (i) ; I mean, that is to
say, to assert that X is characterized by a certain property
of rightneas which belongs to it, or by a certain property
of goodness which belongs to him. If the subjectivists are
right, I do not mean that X has this property, for I am
not in point of fact making a statement about X at all.
What I am stating is that most men in certain circumstances
will experience a certain emotion.
Now I do not for a moment believe that I am, in fact,
saying this. The onus of proof is, therefore, I repeat, on
the subjcctivist to prove to me that I am. This he does
not do; indeed, most of the arguments that he gives in
favour of his position appear to be faulty. In particular,
he gives no good reason for supposing that, when I say
"X is a right action" or "X is a good man", I am not
making what I am certainly purporting to make, namely,
some assertion about X, but am in fact talking about